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ABSTRACT
The Use of Source Versus Message Cues in
Persuasion:
An Information Processing Analysis
(February, 1978)
R.L. Chaiken, B.S., University of Maryland

M.S., University of llassachusetts

,

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Alice H. Eagly
Subjects read a persuasive message under either high or low
perceived

consequences conditions:

High consequences subjects read a message on

the same topic which they anticipated discussing and expressing
their

views on at a future experimental session while low consequences
subjects
read a message on a different topic.

The persuasive message, which con-

cerned one of two topics (sleep habits vs. trimester system), was attri-

buted to a likeable or unlikeable communicator who presented either six
or two arguments supporting his overall position.

Simple effects tests

on initial opinion change showed that high consequences subjects exhibited

significantly greater opinion change in response to messages containing
six (vs. two) persuasive arguments, but notin response to messr.ges from

likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicators;

while low consequences subjects

exhibited, on a marginally significant basis, greater opinion change in

response to messages from likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicators, but
not in response to messages containing six (vs. two) arguments.

The

pattern of results obtained on initial opinion change, as well as results
obtained on ether dependent measures were generally consistent with the
hypothesis that high consequences subjects would engage In a relatively
detailed ir.fcrmation processing strategy in which content-orieiited cogIons would nediate opinioii change, whereas low consequences subjects
WL-nid •^ngaue in a comparatively low-level information proce.ssing strategy

vii
in which source-based cognitions would
primarily mediate initial

opinion change.

Qualified support was also obtained for the
hypothesis

that content-mediated opinion change
would persist longer over time than

would source-mediated opinion change:

Opinion change

decreased signifi-

cantly over a 10 day period for low consequences
subjects but remained

virtually stable over time for high consequences
subjects.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

An examination of recent research in the persuasion area
reveals
at least two different conceptualizations of persuasion,
one emphasizing

and one deemphasizing the importance of in-depth information
processing.
The first conceptualization, which derives, at least in part, from
tradi-

tional treatments of persuasion (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley,
1953;

McGuire, 1968, 1959), views persuasion as a rather detailed process in

which the individual's

acceptance of the position advocated in the

persuasive communication is largely determined by the extent to which the
individual

has attended to, comprehended, and yielded to or accepted

the arguments contained in the message.

Such a conceptualization portrays

the message recipient as a rather rational, content-oriented individual

who bases acceptance (rejection) of the message's conclusion largely on
his (her) understanding and/or evaluation of the argumentation presented
(cf., Eagly,

1974; Kelman & Eagly, 1965).

According to this general

viewpoint, any variable which affects opind.on change does so by influencing
any or all of the processes (attention, comprehension, yielding) that

mediate persuasion.

A second conceptualization cf persuasion reflected in recent empirical work, while not derived from any particular theoretical

framework,

regards persuasion as a comparativ.ely low-level process in which accep-

tance of the position advocated in the message is
based largely on the

individual's somewhat

superficial examination of available information.

Thus, it has been suggested that individuals may
often agree or disagree

with a message's conclusion on the basis of simple
decision rules such

as

whether or not the communicator seems credible (e.g., Miller,
Maruyama,
Beaber,

&

Valone, 1976; McGuire, 1969) or on the basis of other
non-content

information available, including information about the message
recipient's
own internal states (e.g., Mintz & Mills, 1971; Giesen

Munson

&

&

Hendrick, 1974;

Kiesler, 1974) or information about the opinions of other m.essage

recipients (e.g., Landy, 1972).

An implicit assumption of this second

conceptualization Is that a variable such as source credibility, for
example, may affect opinion change directly.

Thus without necessarily

influencing the individual's attention to, comprehension of, acceptance of,
or reactions to the message's argumentation, source credibility

(

or some

other variable) may directly affect the individual's tendency to accept
the message's

overall position.

The distinction between persuasion as a relatively detailed process
and persuasion as a comparatively simple process is similar to distinctions currently being made in the area of psychology of prediction and

explanation.

As Ajzen

(1977) has noted, the assumption that people employ

rather sophisticated information processing strategies to predict and/or

explain human behavior (e.g., Ajzen
1975; Kelley, 1967)

&

Fishbein. 1975; Trope

&

Burnstein,

is being challenged by the view that people often

rely on relatively simple intuitive heuristics (Tversky & Kahaeman, 1974)
or cognicive scripts (Ableson, 1976) is making their judgments.

Analogously,

the view of persuasion as a detailed process portrays the massar^e recipient
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as a rather systematic information processor
who carefully attends to and

screens incoming persuasive argumentation in
arriving at his (her) opinion

judgments while the view of persuasion as

a

comparatively low-level pro-

cess portrays the message recipient as relying on
relatively simple rules

or heuristics in arriving at her/his opinion judgments.

This thesis is concerned with reconciling these two views
of the

persuasion process.

It is assumed that each view is a valid description

of the persuasion process under certain conditions and an
attempt is made
to explore what some of these condiJ:ions might be.

More specifically, the

present concern is with investigating the conditions under which individuals tend to focus attentively on persuasive argumentation and tend to

base their opinions primarily on such content cues or the cognitive responses
to such cues

(e.g., Greenwald, 1968) and, the conditions under which indi-

viduals tend to forego detailed scrutinization of the persuasive messages
they receive and, instead, tend to base their opinions primarily on non-

coutent cues or their cognitive responses to such cues.

Though a variety

of non-content cues may often be available to and used by message recipients

in foraing taeir opinion judgments (e.g., information about the communicator, information about the opinionsof others present in the situation,

information about the recipient's internal states), this thesis focusses
on the use of source cues, since source-related information is typically

available in most persuasion situations.

Thus, the particular empirical

focus of the thesis might be stated as attempting to investigate the use
of source versus message cues in pfersuasicn.

A study by Taylor (1975), though aot in the persuasion area, provides
soTne

insight into what conditions might favor the view of persuasion which

emphasizes relatively in-depth information processing,
and what conditions

might favor the view of persuasion which emphasizes
relatively low-level

information processing.

In Taylor's experiment, designed to determine

some of the conditions under which people infer their
attitudes directly

from their behavior (cf

.

,

Bem, 1972), female subjects received false

physi-

ological feedback regarding their affective reactions toward photographs
of males.

This feedback was either consistent or inconsistent with subjects

previously expressed attitudes toward the photos (attractiveness ratings)
and, further, subjects either expected or did not expect their attitude to

have important consequences (i.e., subjects did or did not expect to meet
the male who received their highest attractiveness rating).

The results

indicated that when attitudes were reassessed, consistency of feedback
was only weakly related to the use of feedback in expressing one's attitude

More importantly, however, it was found that subjects used feedback regarding their (supposed) physiological reactions to the photographic stimuli
in inferring their attitudes only when they expected no future consequences
to result from their attitude.

When future consequences were anticipated,

subjects "engaged in a critical, time consuming reevaluation of their attitudes in which feedback played a minimal role" (Taylor, 1975, p. 126).

Taylor concluded that Individuals may typically engage in relatively lowlevel inferential processes, such as the one outlined by Bem (1972), when

asked to express an attitude on an issue of relatively little importance

but may engage in a more thoughtful information search vrhen asked cc expres
an

attitude which has important personal consequences.
This thesis is undertaken very much

conclusions.

i.n

the spirit of Taylor's (1975)

Regarding persuasion, it might be hypothesized that when an
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individual is faced with the decision of accepting or
rejecting the position advocated in a persuasive communication, and the
issue is an important
one, then persuasion m.ay well be the outcome of a
relatively sophisticated

cognitive process in which content-oriented cognitions mediate opinion
change.

Given inconsequential or unimportant issues, however, persuasion

may be the outcome of a comparatively simple process in which
individuals
engage in minimal processing of available information and tend to rely
on
simple rules or heuristics in forming their opinion judgments. In order to

examine the plausibility of the hypothesis that issue importance or other
factors

affect the nature of the cognitive processes involved in persuasion,

it is helpful to review some relevant literature from the persuasion area.

Review of relevant persuasion literature

One strategy for illuminating the conditions under which in-depth

processing of information contained in persuasive messages is important
in the persuasion process is to compare studies which have versus have not

demonstrated

a

relationship between mediational processes such as reception

and/or acceptance of argumentation and opinion change.

Similarly, one

strategy for illuminating the conditions under which low-level processing
of non-content cues is predominantly important in the persuasion process
(at the expense of detailed processing of persuasive argumentation) is to

compare studies which have versus have no t demonstrated a relationship

between such cues and opinion change;

and further, where non-content cues

have been shown to affect persuasion, to assess

whether their persuasive

impact can or cannot be attributed to their influence on recipient's proces-

sing of the message's persuasive argtmientation.

6

To pursue

the above strategies thoroughly would
be a formidable task,

requiring an examination of a substantial
proportion of the existing

persuasive communication literature.

Thus, in selecting studies for

review, some discretion was exercised.

With respect to studies concerning

the relationship betwenn reception and/or
acceptance of argumentation and

opinion change, primary consideration was given to
experiments examining
the reception-persuasion link rather than the
acceptance of argumentation-

persuasion relationship.

This decision was based on two considerations.

First, there exists relatively more experimental (vs.
correlational)

evidence bearing on the role of reception processes than on the
role of

acceptance processes in persuasion.

Second, in comparison to correlational

evidence regarding the reception-persuasion relationship, correlational
findings concerning the relationship between acceptance of supportive argu-

mentation and persuasion (e.g., correlations between

measures of cour.ter-

arguing or measures of agreement with supportive arguments and opinion
change) are more difficult to interpret unambiguously in terms of the

causal direction of the relationship (cf., Norman, 1976; Miller
1973)

&

Baron,

.

With respect to experiments concerning the relationship between noncontent cues and persuasion, because of the empirical focus of the thesis,

primary consideration was given to studies examining the impact of source
cues on persuasion.

A primary factor used

to select source studies for

review was that such eypsriments should provide (preferably on the inde-

pendent variable side but, at the very least, on the dependent variable
side) information relevant to assessing whether any observed impact of

source cues

on persuasion could or could not be accounted for in terms of

7

their impact on variables typically
assumed to reflect individuals'
processing of persuasive communication
content (e.g., comprehension, counterarguing, agreement with supportive
arguments).
i

i

In the next section, experiments
dealing with the role of detailed

processing of argumentation in persuasion
will be reviewed.

Afterwards,

the review focusses on experiments
concerning the impact of source cues on

persuasion.

Finally, those conditions which appear
to determine the rela-

tive importance of source and m.essage cues in
persuasion will be summarized.

Experiments bearing on the importance of pr ocessing
content cues in persuasion

Correlational studies.

In general, studies providing correlational

evidence regarding the reception-persuasion relationship
have not revealed
a consistently positive (or large) correlation
between retention of message

content and opinion change (for discussions, see Eagly,
1974; Greenwald,
1968; McGuire, 1968).

However, because inadequate measures of content

learning have often been employed (see McGuire, 1958; Fishbein

&

Ajzen,

1975) and, even when adequately constructed, such measures may only weakly

reflect the operation of reception processes in persuasion (Eagly, 1974;

Chaiken

&

Eagly, 1976), such experiments generally provide little basis

for discerning the conditions under which reception processes are important
in persuasion.

However, a cursory examination of the correlational litera-

ture reveals a few dimensions which may be important in determining when

good reception of persuasive argumentation may facilitate opinion change.
Thus, for example, two experiments which did show a positive relationship

between message retention and persuasion (Wilson

a

Killer, 1968; Miller

Campbell, 1959) employed mock courtroom procedures to introduce lengthy

argumentation regarding topics (law suits) abcut which subjects had no

&

,

prior information.

In a study by McGuire (1957). which also
obtained a

significant relationship between comprehension and opinion
change, subjects

were told that the experiment was "an attempt to measure
the comprhensibility
of

information on controversial topics during unrehearsed interview

situations such as found in court rooms, press conferences,
congressional
hearings, etc..." (McGuire, 1957, p. 103).

In contrast, Zimbardo and

Ebbesen (1970), who found no relationship between comprehension and
persuasion, told subjects that by reading passages (persuasive communications)

they would be helping the investigators in their study of "speech behavior".

Unlike subjects in the McGuire (1957) study, subjects learned of the
experimenters' interest in assessing their opinions and comprehension only

after being exposed to the persuasive massage.

Amount of argumentation and persuasion

.

The results of experiments

which have varied the amount of argumentation presented in the persuasive
communication generally support the importance of reception of argumentation in persuasion, with greater persuasion associated with greater amounts
of supportive information provided (Eagly

&

Warren, 1976; 'Worman, 19 76;

Insko, Lind, & LaTcur, 1976; Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974; McCroskey,
1969; Cook, 1969

(experiment II but not experiment I)).

In a series of

experiments reported by Insko and his associates (Insko, Lind,

&

LaTour,

1976; Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974), subjects, role-playing jury members,

were presented with varying numbers of arguments supporting che guilt or
innocence of a fictitious person.

In accord with earlier correlational

studies employing similar mock courtroom procedures (Wilson
MJ.ller & Campbell,

&

Miller, 1968;

1959), it was found consistently across the various

experiments reported that increasing the number of arguments provided
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significantly influenced subjects' judgments
concerning the defendant's
guilt or innocence.

Subjects in Eagly and Warren's (1976) experiment

messages containing either zero or

5

arguments attacking subjects' beliefs

on two cultural truism issues (cf., McGuire
lin use and toothbrushing practices.

received persuasive

&

Pap.^eorgis, 1961)

-

penicil-

Subjects learned that the experiment

concerned "high school students and the way they
handle problems", and

before listening to the communications, completed a
verbal intelligence
measure which was introduced as "a test of some of your
skills - it will
show you how you think and solve problems".

The six minute long communica-

tions were introduced as "a slightly different problem".

Subjects

exposed to five (vs. zero) persuasive arguments evidenced significantly
greater comprehension and opinion change.

Further, high intelligence

subjects were more persuaded than low intelligence subjects given

5

argu-

ments, but less persuaded given no arguments, a result also consistent

with the proposition that reception processes are important in persuasion
(cf., McGuire, 1968).

Utilizing

an impression formation cover story, Norman (1976) presented

subjects with a message containing six or aero arguments supporting the

claim that people should reduce the amount of time they spend sleeping.
The message was attributed to either a physically attractive (but inexpert)

or expert

(b;\t

physically unattractive) communicator.

IThile,

overall,

provision of arguments significantly affected agreement with the message's
conclusion, it was found that this was prim.arily the case for the expert
(vs. attractive) communicator.

Two experiments by Cook (1969) factorily crossed number of arguments

presented and scarce competence.

Experiment

I,

which em.ployed a between

10

subjects design, was introduced as a study of "how
people react to unex-

pected information".
one or

8

Subjects read a persuasive message containing either

arguments supporting the proposition that teeth should be
cleaned

only three times a week,

either 204 words long

(8

labile the messages

which subjects received were

arguments condition) or between

long (1 argument condition)

,

21 and 30 words

the length of the passages describing the

high and low competence source were 90 and 84 words long, respectively.
Though

number of arguments presented significantly affected argument

recall, it had little impact on various measures of subjects' attitudes

toward toothbrushing (although it did affect agreement with the specific

recommendation that teeth be cleaned only three times per week)

.

source competence exerted a strong impact on subjects' attitudes.

Experiment II, high school

In contrast
In

subjects received the identical cover story.

However, four topics were employed (dangers of X-rays, toothbrushing, use
of penicillin, contagiousness of mental illness) and each subject served in

all experimental conditions.

Further, the persuasive messages contained

either two or 10 arguments and, unlike the lengthy descriptions of the
communicators in Experiment

I,

source competence was manipulated via a

one-sentence description of the communicator.

while competence

had been adequately manipulated, the attitude data

showed a main effect
competence.

for number of arguments presented but not for source

In sumiaary,

message agreement

The results indicated that

wa.s

the effect of number of arguments presented on

most evident in Experiment II which utilized a

wi thin-sub j acts design and where information about source competence was
lainimal and least evident in Experiment I v/hich utilized a betveen-subjects

design and in which a more potent manipulation of competence was employed.
Tr.

should be noted that in both experiments "source competence tended to
,

exert a stronger Impact on subjects'
opinions within the high (vs. low)^
arguments conditions. Further, source
competence exerted a significant

impact on counterargument production,
with fewer counterarguments associated
with high competent sources.

McCroskey (1969), reporting the results of
a series of experiments
regarding the persuasive impact of providing
versus not providing evidence,
concluded that providing evidence generally
facilitates opinion change when
source credibility is m.oderate or low, when
the message is delivered with
few nonfluencies, and when the audience is
unfamiliar with the evidence presented.

Regarding the last point, Norman (Note 1), in two
experiments with

Canadian subjects, found, relative to no-message control
subjects, that
•experimental subjects agreed with the position advocated
in the message only

when it contained information which was not redundant with
previous information knovm to subjects.

Both experiments used presum.ably high- involvement

issues (Canadian-U.S. amalgamation, Canadian armaments production)
and both

cover stories stressed the importance of attending carefully to the
communication.

In the second experiment, which employed only the amalgamation issue

and which added a source factor, subjects' agreement was unaffected, in com-

parison to a no-source condition, by whether the communicator was attractive
or expert.
Messac;e comprehensibility and p ersuasion

.

Two studies have investigated

reception processes in persuasion by varying the comprehensibility of persuasive argumentation (Eagly, 1974; McCroskey

&

Mehrley, 1969).

In three expe-

riments by Eagly (197A), involving two different manipulations of arc^ument

comprehensibility (good vs. poor quality tape recordings:
II; well-ordered vs.

III),

Experiments

I

and

randomly ordered sentences or half-sentences: Exy:criment

subjects in poor comprehensibility conditions shoved less corprehension

and less acceptance of the position advocated in the message
than did subjects
in good comprehensibility conditions.

In Experiment III, source credibility

did not affect agreement with the message's recommendation,
either alone or
in interaction with comprehensibility.

Subjects (in all three experiments)

were recruited to "obtain student reactions to lectures" and were told
prior
to message exposure, that some subjects would get lectures that were
difficult
to understand.
I and II)

Tae persuasive messages were either tape-recorded (Experiments

or written (Experiment III) and contained six lengthy arguments

supporting the recomaiendation that people should reduce the amount of time
they spend sleeping.
In the McCroskey and Mehrley

(1969) experiment, subjects, participating

in a study on "speech styles", listened to a message advocating a guaranteed

annual wage for all industrial employees.

seven arguments,

was either "well organized" (i.e., divided into three

distinct sections:
(i.e.,

The message, which contained

introduction, body, conclusion) or highly "disorganized"

within the three divisio ns .sentences were randomly ordered) and was

delivered with or without nonfluencies (e.g., vocal pauses, repetitions).
The well-organized, fluent message induced significantly greater persuasion
than did the other three message conditions.

measures were included so as

Unfortunately, no comprehension

to document the mediational role of argument

reception in accounting for the persuasion findings.

In this study, source

credibility also influenced opinion change although it did not interact

with message organization or fluency.

Message complexity and persuasion

.

Regan and Cheng (1973) manipulated

message complexity in an experiment concerned with the role of distraction
in persuasion.

Recruited for

"

a study on mass media", subjects vers told

to pav ca:.-«ful at:tention to the message.

The tape-recorded message was

13

either easy- or dif f icult-to-understand and was
received under distracting
or nondistracting conditions.

The results indicated that distraction

enhanced persuasion for the simple message but decreased
persuasion for
the difficult one.

Further, distraction decreased subjects' perception
of

the biasedness of the simple (but not complex) message
and decreased (for

both simple and difficult messages) argument recall.

Although these find-

ings are consistent with the hypothesis that distraction
facilitates per-

suasion for simple messages (by counterargument disruption) and reduces

persuasion for complex messages (by interfering with message reception),
they are somewhat ambiguous regarding the specific role of reception processes in persuasion since the simple and complex message differed on at

least three dimensions (length, ease of landerstandir
g^ convincingness of

arguments).

If not speaking directly to the reception-persuasion relation-

ship, the results are at least consistent with other research demonstrating

the importance of reception and/or acceptance processes in mediating the

effects of distraction on opinion change (e.g.. Petty, Wells,

&

Brock, 1976;

Insko, Tumbull, & Yandell, 1975; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; Haaland &

Venkatesan, 1968)
In an experiment more directly related to the reception-persuasion

relationship, Chaiken and Eagly (1976) presented subjects with a simple
or complex message

(i.e., simple vs. compound sentence structure and

simple vs. sophisticated vocabulary) via the written, audio-, or videotaped modality.

In conditions where message complexity was expected to

decrease m.essage comprehensibility (audio- and video-tape but not written
conditions)

,

both comprehension and opinion change were significantly lower

for subjects receiving complex (vs. simple) messages.

recruited

Subjects were

"to help eval.jate the ability of law students to argue legal

lA

cases", and received a lengthy message concerning
a fictitious legal

dispute.

It should

be noted that

variations in the communicator's non-

verbal expressions of confidence, manipulated in
audio- and video-tape
conditions, had no impact on opinion change.

In contrast to the Chaiken and Eagly (1976) study,
Miller, Maruyama,
Beaber, and Valone (1976, Experiment III) found no
differential impact on

opinions as a function of message complexity (manipulated via
simple vs.

complex sentence construction)

.

Since no measures of comprehension were

obtained, it is possible that the Miller et al complexity manipulation

had no impact on opinions because it did not significantly affect message

comprehension (cf., Chaiken

&

Eagly, 1976).

However, assuming that their

manipulation was strong enough to affect comprehension, the difference in
experimental contexts employed in the two studies may help to explain the
seemingly contradictory results.

In the Chaiken and Eagly (1976) labora-

tory study, subjects read a 955-word message presenting new information on

an unfamiliar topic within

a legal case context.

In the Miller et al

(1976) experiment, the experimenter, posing as an interviewer for a local

radio program, approached subjects in a shopping center and requested that
they listen to a tape-recorded "listener's opinion on the topic for the
day".

The 300-word message concerned the dangers of hydroponically grown

vegetables and was attributed to a produce ."anager at an area market.
Unlike the Chaiken and Eagly experiment, subjects were not told that their
opinions were desired until after message exposure.

Like the previous

experiment, the topic was a novel one for subjects.

However, according to

Miller et aly pretesting indicated that few persons knew what the word

hydropcnic meant or likely knew any arguments for or against hydroponic
growing methods.

Thus, as the authors noted,

the message argued "largely
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on the basis of unfamiliar technical
evidence for a conclusion which sub-

jects essentially had to accept on faith"
(Miller et al, 1976, p. 622).
Suimarjr.

Studies demonstrating a relationship
between reception and/

or acceptance of argumentation and opinion
change and thus supporting the

importance of detailed processing of content cues
in persuasion tend to
share a number of common experimental features.
the

One common feature is

extent to which such experim.ents tend to employ experimental
contexts

which

focus subjects' attention on the persuasive
communication content.

Some experiments have explicitly instructed subjects
to pay careful attention to the persuasive message (Norman, Note
1; Regan
.

&

Cheng, 1973).

Others have employed experimental instructions which convey
the experimenter's interest in subjects' comprehension (McGuire, 1957) or
problem-

solving skills (Eagly

&

Warren, 1976).

Still other experiments have

employed mock courtroom or legal case contexts which no doubt convey to
subjects that they should attend carefully to the persuasive communication
content (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Insko, Lind,
& Yandell,

&

LaTour, 1976; Calder, Insko,

1974; Wilson & Miller, 1968; Miller & Campbell, 1959).

Other

features which many of these experiments share is the extent to which they

have employed rather lengthy persuasive messages (Chaiken
Eagly

&

'

Eagly, 1976;

Warren, 1976; Eagly, 1974; Wilson ^ Miller, 1968; Miller & Campbell,

&

1959), employed completely novel topics (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976; Insko, Lind,
& LaTour,

•

Miller

&

1976; Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974; Wilson & Miller, 1968;

Campbell, 1959), or constructed messages on (knorm) topics which

presented unfamiliar or new information to subjects (McCroskey, 1969;
Eagly

&

Warren, 1976; Eagly, 1974;- Cook, 1969; Norman, Note 1).
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Experiments bearing on the impact of n on-content
cues on persuaRinn

.

Impact of audience cues and reci pient's internal
states on persuasion.

Landy (1972) found that subjects expressed
(marginally) greater agreement

with a counterattitudinal
positively

message when an overheard audience reacted

(vs. negatively)

to the speech.

This finding suggests that

individuals may often use consensus-type information
in forming their
opinion judgments.
Giesen and Hendrick (1974) found that false physiological
feedback

concerning subjects' arousal levels during exposure to persuasive
messages

significantly affected opinion change such that high arousal feedback
enhanced persuasion.

Mntz

and Mills (1971), who manipulated actual

physiological arousal, found that arousal which was externally attributed
to the message resulted in greater opinion change than internally
attri-

buted arousal.

Further, arousal had no impact on comprehension.

These

studies suggest that message recipients may sometimes use information

regarding their own internal states in making their opinion judgments.
Thus, as self-perception theory

attributes heightened

(Bern,

1972) might suggest, a subject who

arousal to the communication may infer that the

message had a strong impact on him (her) and thus be persuaded by it.
Regarding the conditions under v^hich these arousal effects have been obtained,

both experiments' cover stories stressed their ''concern" with drugs
(Mintz & Mills, 1971) or arousal (Giesen

&

Hendrick, 1974) and did not

mention explicitly or implicitly their interest in subjects' opinions.
these experiments,

then, it seems that the most salient information

subjects was, in fact, information regarding their bodily states.

'.for

In
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Impact of sourcP, ru.. nn

^ ^^^^^

^^^^^^ studies

indicate that source cues may often affect
opinion change under "low invol-

vement" conditions.

Johnson and Scileppi (1969) presented
subjects with a

conununication recoir^ending that X-ray use
should be curtailed.

The 350-word

message was attributed to a communicator who
was described in 120 words as
either a medical expert (high credibility)
or a medical quack
bility)

.

(

low credi-

Subjects in low involvement conditions learned
that the study

was "mostly an experiment" and that the investigators
were "not interested
In (subjects')

opinions", while high involvement subjects were told
that the

"important" study "concerned the ability of students to
make sound and Intel
ligent judgments", and were told to read all materials
carefully and be

thoughtful

in answering the questionnaires.

Subjects expressed (margi-

nally) greater agreement with the message's recommendation
under low (vs.
high) involvement conditions and under high (vs. low) credibility
conditions

More importantly, however, a significant interaction betv;een involvement
and credibility showed that source credibility exerted a
differential

impact on opinion judgments only under low involvement conditions.

Further,

credibility had no impact on message comprehension.
Rhine and Severance (1970) manipulated involvement by varying the personal relevance of the message topic.

Subjects, who were told that the study

"concerned their opinions on a variety of issues" read a two page

which recommended

a tuition increase at the subjects'

message

University (high

involvement) ot which concerned the amount of park acreage that should be

developed in Allentown, Pennsylvania

were judged very
jects.

ir.:portant and

(

low involvement)

.

These

tvjo

issues

unimportant, respectively, by pretest sub-

In lo^ involvement conditions, source credibility (marginally)

affected opinion while in high involvement conditions, credibility had no
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impact on opinions.

However, high involvement subjects, while not
res-

ponding differentially as a function of source
credibility, did change
their opinions significantly (in comparison to a
no-communication control
group)

The results of other experiments, though they did not
manipulate

"involvement", are consistent with the above findings.

Thus, as noted

earlier, Norman (Note 1), employing a presumably high involvement
issue
for (Canadian) subjects (U.S .-Canadian amalgamation) and a cover
story

which emphasized attending carefully to the message, found that agreement

with the message's conclusion was unaffected (in comparison to a no-source
control group) by whether the communicator was attractive or expert.

And,

Johnson and Steiner (1968) found little attitude change, regardless of the
source's identity, when the (negative) communication concerned subjects'

personal traits.
Horai, Naccari, and Fatoullah (1974) orthogonally manipulated communi-

cator physical attractiveness and communicator-expertise and found that

both source characteristics (independently) affected opinions and that
neither expertise nor attractiveness affected message comprehension.

In

this experiment, female junior high school students, recruited for an expe-

riment on "young people's reactions to opinions expressed in newspapers",
read a short message which advocated that high school students should
•receive a broaJ,

general education.

Since the opinions of a no- communication

control group ^rere slightly favorable toward the position advocated in the
message, it seems appa

.nt

attitudinal for dnbiects.

physical attractiveness

that the persuasive message was not counter-

Finally, Snyder and Rothbart (1971) found that
sigr.if icantly facilitated the communicator's
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persuasiveness and did not affect message comprehension.

In this study,

a presumably low involvement topic was used
(lowered speed limits).

ther,

Fur-

the audio- taped message was short, consisting of only
one set of

arguments, and the investigators' interest in measuring subjects'
opinions

was not made explicit until after subjects had listened to the
persuasive

message which was introduced as a "talk on traffic safety".
The above research is generally consistent with the idea that source
cues most often influence opinion judgments under low involvement conditions.

Under high involvement conditions, subjects may be inclined to

evaluate the communication more critically and may tend to disregard
source cues.

Consistent with this interpretation, Das, Roth, and Stagner

(1955) had subjects rank order 10 passages of poetry which were attributed
to authors who varied in prestige.

group)

While one group of subjects ("prestige"

was simply told to rank order the poems in

second ("understanding
the poetry passages.

")

term.s of

merit, a

group was instructed to focus on the merit of

The results showed that che source prestige factor

had a greater impact on subjects' rankings when the factor of "understanding"
was not brought into focus.
Other factors too may influence the tendency of message recipients
to use source cues in arriving at their opinion judgments.

McCroskey (1970)

presented subjects with a persuasive message on the topic of federal control
of education which was attributed to a high or low credibility communicator

and which contained either strong or minimal evidence in support of the

message's overall conclusion.

While credibility significantly affected

opinion change when minimal evidence was provided, it did not influence
opinions when strong evidence was presented.

This finding suggests that

subjecus used inf ormation regarding the source's identity in forming their
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opinion judgments only when the nature of the
information contained in the

message provided an insufficient basis on which to form
an opinion judgment.

Another condition which may influence an individual's
tendency to rely on
source cues in making their opinion judgments is suggested
by the Miller,
Maruyama, Beaber, and Valone (1976) experiment reviewed
previously.

In that

experiment (study II), subjects listened to a tape-recorded message
which
discussed, largely on the basis of unfamiliar technical evidence,
the dangers of hydroponically grown vegetables.

The results indicated that the

speed at which the communication was delivered significantly affected
per-

ceptions of the communicator's credibility (faster speech being associated

with greater perceived credibility) and significantly affected agreement
with the message's conclusion.

Further, the results of this study (and

two others reported by the authors) indicated that the effect of speech

rate on persuasion was apparently not mediated by either reception processes
or by the tendency for subjects to differentially accept the arguments

presented in the message.

One interpretation for these findings is that

subjects were forced to base their opinions of their perceptions of communicator credibility alone, simply because they were unable to evaluate the
merit

of or even fully comprehend the message's argumentation due to its

highly technical nature.

Before turning to a closer examination of whether the persuasive impact
of source cues can or cannot be attributed to their influence on recipients'

processing of persuasive communication content, it is perhaps useful to

briefly revievr the findings of some of the early work by Hovland and his
associates (Hovland

&

Weiss, 1951; Hovland &

Mandell, 1952; Kelman &

Hovland, 1953) regarding the impact of source cues on persuasion.
in the Hcvland and i^eiss

''1951)

Subjects

study received four persuasive messages on
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four different topics which were attributed
to high or low trustworthy

connnunicators.

The sources' identities were revealed
to subjects at the

end of each persuasive message.

Although the length of each message is

not reported, it is likely that they were
of short or moderate length due
to the fact that subjects were exposed
to four during the course of the

experimental session.

The results indicated that on three of the
four

topics, the high trustworthy

source was significantly more persuasive

than the low trustworthy communicator.

impact on a measure of content leraning.

Further, trustworthiness had no

On a measure of opinion change

one month later (where the authors obtained the so-called
"sleeper effect"),
no differential impact due to the sources' trustworthiness
was obtained
on opinions.

Kelman and Hovland (1953) exposed high school subjects to

a message on juvenile delinquency (length not described)
which advocated
a (presumably) desirable point of view on the topic (lenient
treatment of

delinquents).

Via a fairly lengthy introduction, the communicator was

portrayed as either high in credibility (expert, trustworthy, attractive)
or low in credibility (inexpert, untrustworthy, unattractive)."'" In addition, differences in voice and style of delivery, in keeping with the

communicators' personalities suggested by the introduction, were maintained

during the tape-recorded presentation of the persuasive message.

Using

this potent manipulation, the authors found significantly greater initial

agreement with the message's
(vs.

low) in credibility.

conclusion when the communicator was high

On a three-v/eek delayed posttest, the differential

persuasiveness of the high (vs. low) credible communicator was apparent
only for subjects who, at the time of the posttest, were reminded of the
coiinnun"
nicator's

identicy.

In accord with Hovland and Weiss'

(1951) results.
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for subjects who were not reminded of the
communicator's identity, the

effects of the credibility manipulation had
declined entirely by the time
of the delayed opinion assessment.

In contrast to these findings, Hovland

and Mandell (1952) found no significant difference
in persuasion as a

function of communicator trustworthiness.

In the experiment, subjects

were exposed to a relatively lengthy and detailed persuasive
message which
argued that U.S. currency should be devalued.

In contrast, information

provided regarding the communicator's trustworthiness/untrustworthiness
was conveyed via a short introduction which described the
communicator as
either an economist at a leading University (high trust) or as the
head of
an

importing firm (low trust).
Cognitive mediation of source effects

.

On the basis of those experi-

ments which have included measures designed to tap subjects'

comprehension

of communication content, it seems likely that the impact of source cues

on persuasion is not typically mediated by reception processes.

Assessing

whether source effects may be mediated by the tendency for subjects to
differentially accept the message's argumentation as a function of the
communicator's identity is more difficult since researchers typically do
not measure such processes directly but rather infer their operation from

obtained opinion change findings (cf., McGuire, 1968).

However, the

results of the Miller, Maruyama, Beaber, and Valone (1976) experiment as

well as the results of experiments which have found no effect of source
cues on persuasion (Johnson

&

Scileppi's (1970) and Rhine & Severence's

(1970) high involvement conditions;

1968; Chaiken & Eagly,

Norman, Note 1; Johnson

&

Steiner,

1976; Eagly,- 1974, Experiment III; Das, Roth,

Stagner's (1955) "understanding" condition; McCroskey's (1970) strong

ft
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evidence condition; Hovland & Mandell,
1952) are consistent with the idea
that source effects are not typically
mediated by differential acceptance
of the supportive arguments contained
in the persuasive communication.

Also consistent with this notion is the
observation that source credibility effects tend to dissipate over time
(Cook & Flay, Note

3;

Gillig &

Greenwald, 197A; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Hovland
& Weiss, 1951) whereas
the effects of presenting good evidence in
support of a message's conclusion

tends to result in relatively sustained opinion
change (McCroskey, 1969).
If credibility effects were typically mediated
by differential acceptance

of communication content, then it might be expected
that credibility effects

would remain more stable over time.
At least a few studies, however, suggest that source effects
on opinion
change may, under some conditions at least, be accounted for in terms
of
their facilitative effects on acceptance of supportive argmnents.

example, Cook (1969, Experiment

I)

For

found that source credibility signifi-

cantly affected opinion change and, further, that subjects produced signi-

ficantly fewer counteragruments and rated the message's arguments as

significantly more powerful when the message was attributed to a high (vs.
low)

credibility communicator.

And, Norman (1976) found, for an expert

(but not attractive) communicator, that subjects' agreement with the specific

arguments presented in the message was significantly correlated with their

agreement with the m.essage's overall conclusion.

For the attractive com-

municator, the finding that argument agreement did not correlate with overall agreement, is consistent with other research and theorizing (Mills &

Harvey, 1972; Kelnan, 1961) suggesting that the impact of source attractiveness on perstiasion is relativ.^.ly independent of reaction to the specific
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arguments presented in the message.

Finally, Johnson, Torcivia, and

Poprick (1968) found that a high credible
communicator exerted significantly greater opinion change that a low
credible communicator on both
an immediate and delayed posttest.

The fact that in this experiment,

the effects of credibility did not dissipate
over

tim.e,

is consistent

with the idea that credibility may have exerted
its impact on opinions by
differentially affecting subjects' acceptance of the
message's arguments.
This conclusion assumes that accepting a message's
arguments provides more

cognitive supports for the individual's newly adopted opinion,
and thus

makes it more stable

over time than does simple acceptanceof the message's

overall conclusion.

A more direct demonstration that source credibility can facilitate
acceptance of supportive arguments was provided by Ajzen and Sejwacz (Note
2).

In their experiment, subjects were presented with various statements

(e.g., "There is a 60% chance that violence shown on TV increases the

nation's crime rate.")
dibility.

attributed to sources who varied in perceived cre-

Instead of rating their agreement with the statements, subjects

indicated their probability of accepting the various statements.

The

results indicated that probability of acceptance increased with source

credibility.
It is of some interest to note that all three persuasion experiments

which suggest that source credibility may sometimes affect opinion change
indirectly by facilitating acceptance of persuasive arguments (Cook, 1969,

experiment I;

Norman, 1976; Johnson, Torcivia, & Poprick, 1968) employed

persuasive messages which attacked subjects' beliefs in cultural truisms
(e.g., sleep habits, toothbrushing, X-rays).

While these messages were,
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no doubt, highly counterattitudinal
(unlike the topics used innany experi-

ments which have obtained source effects),
it is likely that subjects had

never been exposed to information countering
their beliefs or even possessed
any cognitive supports for their beliefs (cf.,
McGuire, 1964).

exposed to communications which

presented

Thus, when

novel arguments attacking

their beliefs, it is conceivable that subjects
found it a difficult task
to evaluate the merit of the message's
arguments.

Being uncertain as to

the validity of such arguments, it seems plausible
that subjects might

use communicator-related information as an additional
aid in evaluating
the validity of the message's arguments.

In situations in which the mes-

sage's argumentation is relatively easy to evaluate on its
own merit,

it

seems likely that recipients' judgments regarding argument
validity will

not typically be influenced by their perceptions of the communicator
(e.g.,

McCroskey's (1970) strong evidence condition).

It

mght be

hypothesized

that to the extent that the arguments presented in a message are intelli-

gible to the individual and can readily be evaluated with some degree of

certainty by the individual, source credibility may have little influence
on the person's tendency to accept such arguments.

However, to the extent

that the message's argumentation cannot be evaluated with much certainty,
the individual may well use additional information about the communicator's

identity in assessing the merit of the argumentation provided.
Summary

.

Experiments which have successfully demonstrated the impact

of non-content cues, particularly source cues, on persuasion share a number
of commonalities.

One common feature is the extent to which such studies

tend to employ experimental contexts which reduce the likelihood chat subjects' attention will be focussed on the persuasive message content.

For
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example, the Giesen and Hendrick
(1974) and Mintz and Mills (1971) expe-

riments utilized cover stories which rather
explicitly focussed subjects'

attention on the non-content cues (subjects'
arousal level) whose persuasive impact was to be demonstrated, but which
neither explicitly nor impli-

citly conveyed to subjects (prior to message
exposure) that their opinions

were of interest to the investigators.

This "sin of omission" is common

to many experiments demonstrating the
persuasive impact of source cues as

well.

An extreme example is provided by Johnson and Scileppi
(1969) who

found that source credibility significantly affected
opinion change when
(low involvement) subjects were told that the study was
"mostly an expe-

riment" and that the investigators were "not interested in (subjects')
opinions".

In contrast, source cues have been shown to have little impact

on opinion judgments when subjects have been explicitly instructed to

attend carefully to the persuasive communication content (e.g., Norman,
Note 1;

Das, Roth, & Stagner's

& Scileppi's

(1955) "understanding" condition; Johnson

(1969) high involvement condition).

Another commonality is

the degree to which source effects on opinion change have been obtained

when proattitudinal issues or issues of relatively low importance or personal

relevance have been used (e.g., Rhine

involvement condition;

Horai, Naccari,

&

&

Severnce's (1970) low

Fatoullah, 1974;

bart, 1971) but not when issues of high importance or

have been employed (e.g., Rliine
tion;

&

Snyder & Roth-

personal relevance

Severnce's (1970) high involvement condi-

Norman, Note 1; Johnson & Steiner, 1968).

Other research suggests

that message recipients may rely on source cues in forming their opinion

judgments when the message's argumentation provides an insufficient basis
on which to form an ooiniou judgment

(McCroskey, 1969) or when the argu-
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mentation is so technical that it is difficult
or impossible for the
recipient to process (Miller, Maruyama, Beaber,

&

Valone, 1976).

Those experiments which have included measures
of content learning

show no evidence that source effects on opinion
change are mediated by

reception processes.

Further, the majority of experiments reviewed pro-

vide little support for the view that source cues
typically affect persuasion via their impact on recipients' tendencies to
differentially
accept the argumentation contained in the message.

Those experiments which

are consistent with the view that source effects are mediated
by argument

acceptance processes (CookA969 Johnson, Torcivia
;

& Pop rick, 1968 ; Norman,

1976)

suggest that this is most likely to be the case when the message contains

novel or unfamiliar argumentation that is difficult to evaluate on its

own merit.

Summary of relevant persuasion research:

conditions affecting the impact

of source versus message cues on persuasion

.

Individuals may base their opinion judgments primarily on their under-

standing and/or evaluation of the persuasive argumentation provided rather
than on their reactions to source (or other non-content) cues when they

believe that it is important to be well informed on the persuasive communication issue.

One

factor which likely affects the individual's motivation

to be well informed on the communication topic is the extent to which the

individual perceives that holding a particular opinion on the issue has
important future consequences for him(her)self or for other persons.

A

number of experiments which have successfully demonstrated the impact of
content cues on persuasion have presented persuasive messages to subjects
in the context of legal disputes (Chaiken

& Eagly,

19 76;

Insko, Lind L
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LaTour, 1976; Calder, Insko,

Miller

&

Campbell. 1959).

&

Yandell, 1974; Wilson & Miller, 1968;

In these experiments, subjects'
opinions were

essentially verdicts and. though perhaps having few
personal consequences
for subjects, certainly had consequences for
the persons or groups invol-

ved in the legal disputes.

When the individual perceives that his (her)

opinion judgment will have personal consequences Ce.g..
the individual
may anticipate having to defend his (her) opinion or
may anticipate having
to engage in

behavior congruent with his (her) opinion), it also seems

likely that the individual will be motivated to be well informed
on the

communication issue and will thus tend to base his (her) opinion
judgment

primarily on his (her)
tation provided.

understanding and/or evaluation of the argumen-

When few or no consequences are anticipated, individuals

may be less motivated to be well informed on the communication issue and
therefore less inclined to process information presented in the message.
Instead, individuals may form their opinion jtadgments using relatively

simple rules or heuristics based on their reactions to available noncontent cues.

Studies which have simply asked subjects to offer their

opinions on comparatively inconsequential issues (e.g.. Horai, Naccari.
& Fatoullah, 1974; Snyder & Rothbart, 1971; ItLller, Maruyama, Beaber, &

Valone, 1976) have found that subjects' opinions were strongly affected
by information regarding the communicator, but no evidence that either

reception cr argument acceptance processes have mediated these observed
source effects.

It should be noted that in the pre3c'..t context,

the

term future consequences applies to situations characterized by Kelman
(1958,

1961) as involving the internalizatioa (vs. identification or

compliance) process of opinion change.

Thus, the zerm does not refer to
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situations in which the message recipient perceives that holding
a certain opinion has consequences or implications with respect to
establishing
or maintaining some self-defining relationship to the communicator
or to

situations in which the recipient believes that the public expression of
a certain opinion has consequences with respect to facilitating some

strategically-based interpersonal goal.

Another factor which may affect the individual's motivation to be
well informed on the communication topic and therefore his/her willingness to process persuasive communication content is the inherent importance or personal relevance of the comm.unication topic. 2 Inhere topics of

little importance or personal relevance have been employed (e.g., Rhine
& Severence's

(1970) parks issue; Snyder & Rothbart's (1971) speed limit

issue; Miller et al 's(1976) hydroponics issue), the findings suggest that

subjects have tended to form their opinion judgments primarily on the

basis of source cues, with little evidence that these effects have been

mediated by either reception or acceptance processes.

In contrast, where

topics of high importance or personal relevance have been used, the findings

suggest that source cues have typically not affected opinions but that
subjects

have changed their opinions on the basis of information contained

in the persuasive communication (e.g., Norman's (Note 1) Canadian-U.S.

amalgamation issue:
sleep issue)

.

Rhine

& Severence's

(1970)

tuition issue; Eagly's (1974)

Further, in those few studies where source

effects have

been obtained with issues of greater importance or personal relevance,,
the persuasive impact of source cues can plausibly be accounted for in
terms of their impact on subjects'' tendencies to accept the arguments con-

tained in the n^essage (e.g.. Cook's (1969) toothbrushlng issue; Norman's

30

(1976) sleep issue)

Even when individuals are willing to process incoming
persuasive

argumentation, the quality or quantity of this information may
work to
force the individual to rely primarily on

source or other non-content

cues in arriving at an opinion judgment.

Thus, as noted earlier, sub-

jects in the Miller et al (1976) experiment may have based their opinions

ontheirperceptions of the communicator's credibility alone, simply because the highly technical argumentation provided in the message was too
difficult for subjects to evaluate with any certainty.

And, McCroskey's

(1970) experiment which showed that source cues affected opinion change

only when minimal evidence was provided, suggests that when insufficient

argumentation is provided, recipients may have little information other
than the communicator's identity on which to base an opinion judgment.

Recipients' attention to source versus

message cues and therefore

their tendency to use source versus message cues in forming their opinion

judgments may also be influenced by the sheer quantity of information pertaining to each source of information.

Studies which have demonstrated

the impact of m.essage reception on opinion change but have found no impact

of source cues on persuasion, have exposed subjects to rather lengthy

messages but rather brief descriptions of the coiranunicator (e.g., Eagly,
1974, Experiment III;

Cook, 1969, Experiment II).

In contrast, studies

where source effects have been obtained, have tended to supply subjects

with greater amounts of information

about the communicator relative to

the amount of information ccntained in the message (e.g.. Cook, 1969, Expe-

riment

I)

or, when source descriptions have been brief (or manipulated via

non-written materials) subjects have been exposed to relatively short
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messages (e.g., Snyder

&

Rothbart. 1971; Horal. Naccari, & Fatoullah.

1974).

Finally, the studies reviewed

previously suggest that subjects'

attention to and therefore use of source versus
message cues may vary
depending upon instructional set.

VJhen

instructions make message content

salient for subjects, message cues may heavily influence
subjects' opinions

while source cues may have minimal impact (e.g., Johnson

&

Scileppi's

(1969) high involvement condition; Eagly (1974), Experiment III;
& Eagly,

Chaiken

1976; Norman, Note 1; Das, Roth, & Stagner's (1955) understanding

condition)

CHAPTER
TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF

TITO

II

INFORMATION PROCESSING

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF PERSUASION

Much research in persuasion implicitly
assumes that yielding to the
position advocated in a persuasive communication
is often influenced by
the information presented in or elicited
by the persuasive message, whose

contents consist primarily of a series of arguments
which presumably pro-

vide cognitive supports for the message's overall
position.

In this broad

view of the persuasion process, the persuasive
impact of independent variables (e.g, source variables) is largely ascribed
to their impact on recep-

tion processes and/or argument acceptance processes.

This conceptualization

of persuasion emphasizes the importance of detailed
information processing

and the role of content-oriented cognitions in mediating
opinion change.
In contrast, a second conceptualization of persuasion
deemphasizes the

importance of detailed information processing and the mediational role of

content-oriented cognitions.
Beaber,

&

As some researchers (e.g., Mller, Maruyama,

Valone, 1976; Eagly & Himmelfarb, 1974; McGuire, 1969) have sug-

gested, individuals may often engage in only a minimal aracunt of information

processing and may base their opinion judgments on a rather superficial
assessment of available information.

In this second view of persuasion, the

persuasive Impact of source (or other independent) variables may be ascribed
to

their direct impact

on the recipient's tendency to yield to the overall

position advocated in the message.
Both views of persuasion portray the message recipient as concerned with
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assessing the validity of message's overall
position.
to the first, and more "systematic" view,

However, according

the message recipient expends a

great deal of cognitive effort in performing
this task:

he(she) actively

attempts to understand the message's arguments and
to assess the validity
of the arguments in relation to the message's
overall conclusion.

While

the recipient's attention is primarily focussed
on the message's argumen-

tation,

other available

also be used to

information, particularly communicator cues, may

evaluate the argumentation, especially when such argumenta-

tion is difficult to assess on its own merit.
cues, when utilized at all by the

However, because communicator

recipient, should function as a secondary

source of information in judging message validity, it would be expected
that

variations insource characteristics might bear only a weak and inconsistent

relationship to opinion change in situations where the "systematic" view

accurately describes the persuasion process.

According to the second, and more "heuristic" view of persuasion, the
message recipient expends relatively little cognitive effort in deciding

whether to accept (or reject) the message's overall position.

Instead, the

recipient may use (the more or less) readily available information in the
form of source (or other non-content) cues in judging message validity.

Should the persuasion process proceed along these lines,

then it would be

expected that while variations in source characteristics may exert a strong
impact on opinion change, variations in message characteristics (e.g.,

amount

of supportive argumentation provided, comprehensibility of supportive

argumentation,

validity of supportive argumentation) may bear only a weak

relationship to opinion change.

Basing acceptance of the message's overall position solely cn information
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from source (or other non-content) cues may reflect
the operation of rela-

tively general rules (scripts, schemas) developed by the
individual through

his(her) past experiences and observations (cf., Abelson,
1976; Stotland
Canon, 1972).

&

Thus, it is likely that individuals have developed the schema,

or the categorical script (Abelson, 1976) that statements made
by recognized

experts can, with reasonable confidence, be accepted as veridical
descriptions
of reality; or,

the schema that statements made by persons perceived as

generally trustworthy can, with reasonable confidence, be considered to
reflect those persons' honest opinions rather than ulterior motives.

With

regard to source attractiveness, on the basis of past experience, the individual may have abstracted a rule suggesting that "people generally agree

with people they like".

Alternatively, the liking/agreement schema may

represent a higher-order schema, perhaps derived from a lower-order rule

suggesting a fairly consistent association between the concepts of liking
and interpersonal similarity (Stotland

individual may accept

&

Canon, 1972).

In any case,

the

(reject) the position advocated by an attractive

(unattractive) source because of the simple rule that he/she typically

agrees (disagrees) with people he/she likes (dislikes).

It should be noted

that this interpretation of source attractiveness effects in persuasion

differs considerably from motivational explanations which suggest that indi-

viduals accept influence from attractive sources out of a desire to emulate
or identify with them (Xelman, 1958, 1961), or to maintain cognitive con-

sistency (Keider, 1958); and also differs from a simple conditioning e-rplanation which suggests that a favorable (or unfavorable) attitude toward
the position advocated results from the contiguity of presentation of an

affectively positive (or negative) communicator and the overall position
advocated.
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This thesis has attempted to provide
some insight into what factors

might favor the "systematic" view
of persuasion, with its focus on
detailed
information processing, and what factors
might favor the "heuristic" view of
persuasion, with its focus on relatively
minimal information processing.

'

Based on the earlier review of the literature,
it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the systematic conceptualization
of persuasion will be most des-

criptive of the pers-oasion process when the
persuasive communication issue is
important or peisonally relevant or when
message recipients perceive that

holding an opinion on the issue has important
consequences for themselves or
for others.

On the other hand, the "heuristic" view of
persuasion will be

most descriptive of the persuasion process when the
persuasive communication
issue is relatively unimportant or personally irrelevant,
or when message recipients perceive that holding an opinion on the issue
has few consequences.

A

corollary hypothesis suggests that variations in source
characteristics are
likely to exert a greater impact and variations in message
characteristics a
lesser impact on persuasion when issues of low importance or personal
relevance
are involved, or when a minimum of future consequences are anticipated.

In

contrast, given important or personally relevant issues, or situations where

individuals do expect that their expressed opinions will have consequences
for themselves or others, variations in source characteristics are likely to

exert a lesser impact and variations in message characteristics a greater

impact on persuasion.

Before presenting an experiment which was designed to

explore some of the ideas which have been discussed, two inplications of the
above hypotheses, one regarding the stability of opinion change and one

regarding individual differences, should be considered.

Stability of opinion chan<;e

.

One implication of the preceding discus-

sion concerns the stability or persistence of opinion change.

First, it
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important to note that although individuals'
opinions may often be considered strategic responses made in the
interests of situational utility

rather than genuine attitude change (cf.,
Gialdini, Levy. Herman. Ko.lowski,
& Petty,

1976). this thesis has assumed that acceptance of
the overall

position advocated in the message, whether it be
an outgrowth of the recipient's detailed scrutinization of the
argumentation presented or a product
of the individual's decision to accept the
overall position simply on the

basis of source (or other non-content) cues, represents
genuine opinion
change.

Nevertheless,

the stability or persistence of opinion change may

differ when opinion judgments have been made primarily on
the basis of
content versus source cues.

Essentially, when a person changes a belief

on the basis of who the source is

,

rather than what the source

says, it

is probable that the person possesses fewer topicrelevant cognitive

sup-

ports for the new belief than does the person who has changed a belief

primarily on the basis of what the source has said, since what the source
has to say typically consists

of topic-related arguments or statements

which serve to support the overall belief advocated in the message.

If

this reasoning is correct, and it can be assumed that belief or attitude

change with respect to some attitudinal topic tends to remain stable over
time to Che extent that it is adequately supported by other topic-relsvant

cognitions, then it might be hypothesized that opinion judgments formed

primarily

r>n

the basis of content cues will tend to persist longer over

time than will opinion judgments formed primarily on the basis of source
(or other r.on-content)

cues.

to dissip^:te over time

CCook & Flay, Note

whereas

tl.e

The observation that credibility effects tend
3;

Gillig

&

Greenwald, 1974)

effects of presenting evidence tends to persist (McCroskey

,

19f?9)
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is generally congenial to this
hypothesis.

In passing.however.

it should be noted that it may
not always be the

case that opinions adopted solely on the
basis of source (or other noncontent) cues will fail to exhibit stability
over time.

Thus, despite the

fact that an individual who has initially
adopted an opinion primarily on
the basis of non-content cues may well lack
supporting topic-relevant cog-

nitions, that individual's subsequent expressions
of an opinion (on the

same attitudinal topic) may still exhibit stability
under certain conditions

.

Such conditions might include situations in which
opinion reassessment occurs
in a context where those cues on which the initial
opinion judgment was

based are present and (still) salient for the individual, or

situational

contexts in which the original acceptance (rejection) cues, although
absent,
have, for whatever reason, remained salient.

Of some relevance here are

Kelman and Hovland's (1953) findings regarding reinstatement of the
communicator in the delayed measurement of opinions:

asive advantage of a high (vs. low) prestige

Whereas the initial persusource tended to dissipate

entirely when, at a three-week delayed posttest, subjects were not reminded
of the communicator's identity, the effect of reinstating the communicator

cue at the time of the posttest was to reestablish, to a large extent, the

initially observed differences in agreement induced by the prestige manipulation.

Individual differences
the

.

Just as situations may differ with respect to

degree to which they foster low-level versus detailed information

processing strategies on the part of message recipients, so too may individuals differ in their habitual tendencies to engage in minimal versus

detailed processing of information available in tbe persuasion situation.
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To this author's knowledge, there are
no existing individual difference

measures which attempt to tap directly the
extent to which individuals tend
to engage in minimal versus detailed
information processing. However,
individual difference measures such as locus
of control orientation (Rotter,
1966), need for cognition (Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe,
1955; Cohen, 1957),

as well as others

(e.g., intellignece, cognitive complexity)
may. to some

extent, reflect this individual difference
dimension.

CHAPTER

III

AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE
USE OF
SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES IN PERSUASION

Introduction and Predictions
The present experiment was designed to
test the hypothesis that when

future

consequences are perceived to stem from an individual's
expressed

opinion on some issue, that variations in message
characteristics should
exert a strong impact on opinion judgments whereas
variations in source

characteristics should exert a minimal impact;

but when little or no

future consequences are anticipated, variations in source
characteristics

should exert a strong impact on opinion judgments whereas
variations in

message characteristics should exert a lesser impact.

As a secondary goal,

the experiment examined the relative stability over time
of opinion change.
In the study, communicator likeability, number of persuasive
arguments

provided, and the perception of future consequences were experimentally

manipulated.

Communicator likeability was varied by having the coipjuunicator

either prise or insult college students prior to delivering

message (on one of two topics) to college student subjects.
persuasive arguments provided was manipulated

a

persuasive
The number of

by preparing persuasive mes-

sages which contained either two or six arguments supporting the message's

overall position.

The expectation of future consequences was varied by

-presenting subjects with a persuasive message which concerned the same topic
or a different topic from the topic subjects anticipated discussing with

other students and being interviewed about at a (hypothetical) future

experimental session.

The.

future consequences manipulation was designed
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AO
to create two persuasion contexts
differing in terms of the degree to

which they would foster detailed versus
low-level information processing
strategies on the part of subjects:

Subjects in high perceived consequences

conditions should be highly motivated to be well
informed on the topic of
the persuasive message and should therefore
expend the cognitive effort

required to understand and carefully screen incoming
persuasive argumentation so as to arrive at some correct, valid, or
defensible position on the
issue.

In contrast, it was assumed that subjects in low
consequences con-

ditions, because they should have little stake in being
well informed on
the issue discussed in the communication, would opt for a
relatively simple

information processing strategy in which the readily available
information
about the communicator's identity would be used as a major criterion
in

accepting (rejecting) the message's overall position.
The major dependent variable was opinion change

—

measured (in the

laboratory) immediately after exposure to the persuasive communication and
then reassessed (over the phone) in a different context approximately 10
days later.

Other dependent measures included the time spent by subjects

reading the persuasive message, subjects' comprehension of the message's

supportive arguments, subjects' thoughts elicited by exposure to the persuasive m.essage, and subjects' perceptions of the communicator.

These

latter measures were included in order to explore the cognitive mediation
of opinion change.

Given high conseq*uences , variations in the amount of supportive argumentatj.on provided should exert a strong impact on initial opinion judgments

whereas variations in comniunicator likeability should exert a minimal
impact.

Given low perceived consequences, however, variations in the
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amotint of supportive information provided
should exert a minimal impact

on initial opinion judgments whereas variations
in communicator likeability should exert a stronger impact.

Thus, within high consequences

conditions, it was predicted that the simple arguments
effect but not
the simple likeability effect would be significant
on initial opinion change,

while, within low consequences conditions, it was
predicted that the simple

likeability but not the simple arguments effect would be
significant.

These

simple effect predictions generated the overall prediction
that the full

analysis of variance would yield both a significant

Consequences X Likea-

bility and Consequences X Arguments interaction on initial opinion change.
While very strong confirmation of the hypothesis would include finding
no
overall effect due to either the likeability or arguments manipulation, it
was anticipated that main effects due to both these variables would also be

obtained on initial opinion change.
The consequences main effect should not be significant on initial opi-

nion change since opinion judgments based on content- related information
should not necessarily differ

in initial magnitude from opinion judgments

formed primarily on the basis of source cues.

However, a consequences main

effect on delayed opinion change, indicating greater change for subjects in
high, compared to low, consequences conditions, would be expected if, as

hypothesized earlier, source-mediated opinion change tends to be less stable
over time than content-mediated opinion change.

If the (presumably source-

mediated) opinion change expressed by subjects in low consequences conditions

decreases significantly between opinion posttests while the (presumably

content-mediated) opinion change shown by subjects in high consequences
conditions does not, then the Time of Assessment X Consequences interaction
>nou.
lid

be significant in a repeated measures analysis of variance on opinion
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change
Subjects' responses on other dependent
measures should provide addi-

tional support for the above hypotheses.

In high perceived consequences

conditions, in comparison to low perceived
consequences conditions, subjects

should exhibit greater comprehension of the
message's arguments, should
spend a greater amount of time reading the
persuasive communication, and

should generate a greater number of message-oriented
than communicator-

oriented thoughts in response to the persuasive
message.

In addition, sub-

jects' comprehension scores, and message-oriented
thoughts should tend to be

significantly correlated with initial opinion change in
high, but not low,

perceived consequences conditions.

In low, but not high, perceived conse-

quences conditions, subjects' perceptions of the
communicator should tend
to be

significantly correlated with initial opinion change.

Method

Overview
Subjects read a persuasive message from a likeable or unlikeable com-

municator who presented six or two arguments in support of the overall

position he advocated.

The topic discussed in the message (sleep habits or

trimester system) was either Identical to or different from

the topic that

subjects anticipated expressing their views on at a (hypothetical) future
experim.ental session.

After reading the message, subjects indicated their

opinions and gave other responses-

Approximately 10 days later, subjects'

opinions were reassessed in a non-laboratory context.
Subjects

A total of 207 University of Itassachusetts

'

psychology students (88

males and 119 females) served as experimental subjects.

Data from 24 of
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these subjects were discarded:

Six subjects were elitninated
because they

could not be contacted for the delayed
measure of opinions and

minated because they were over 25 years
of age.
dropped because they suspected an

experiment's

7

were eli-

Eleven more subjects were

influence attempt (3). questioned the

cover story (6), or associated the delayed opinion
posttest

with their earlier laboratory participation
served as opinion-only control subjects.

(2)

.

Fifty additional students

All subjects received extra credit

toward their course grades for participating.

Procedure
Subjects were recruited for a two-session experiment
dealing with

"people's attitudes and the discussions that revolve around
individuals'

varying perspectives on issues", and participated in
the first (and, in
actuality, only) session in numbers ranging from one to
six persons (average

session size =

2. A

subjects).

One of three experimenters (two males, one

female) greeted subjects and then summaraized what would transpire
in the

"first"

experimental session.

According to the experimenter, subjects would

receive further details regarding the "second and major" experimental session,

be assigned discussion topics, give their preliminary opinions on various
discussion topics, and give their reactions to "one other set of materials".

After this introduction, the experimenter described the (hypothetical)
second experimental session.

Subjects were told that they each would be

interviewed by an experimenter who, after requesting some background inforaiation,

would ask for their opinions on their assigned topics as well as

their reasons for holding their opinions.
views, which would provide

''an

Subjects learned that the inter-

in-depth reading of their opinions", would

be tape- j;ecorded and transcribed into written format for content-analysis.

Assurance was given that subjects' names
transcripts.
of the

would not appear on the written

Next, the experimenter explained that "in
the major portion

second session", subjects would participate in
small discussion

groups with other undergraduates who had been assigned
to their same topics.
The experimenter said that each group would discuss
"their respective views
on their assigned topic" and that the purpose of
holding the discussions was
"to study the processes by which groups do and do not
arrive at judgments

on issues".

It was also stated that the discussions would be
tape-recorded

and later content analyzed.

At this point, the experimenter mentioned that a similar study had

been conducted the previous semester and that the study had used the same
discussion topics

but had not employed undergraduate subjects.

Instead,

the experimenter said that the previous experiment had used faculty members

and various University administrators as subjects in order to study "people

who frequently had to formulate decisions in groups".

It was said that the

previous study had yielded "interesting results" and that the present study

was being conducted with undergraduates so that "comparisons could be made

between the two subject populations".

After soliciting questions regarding the procedures for the "second"
session, which subjects learned "would be held later in the semester", the

experimenter announced that it was time to assign subjects to discussion
topics.

Subjects were told that groups were being formed around "the same

topics used in the previous study", and received a page listing five topics.

Three topics concerned campus -related issues and two concerned health-related
issues.

Topics three and four on this list were "whether or not people

should sleep less that the typical average of eight hours per night", and
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"whether or not the University should switch from
its two-semester system
to a trimester system",

respectively.

The experimenter explained that

because "it was a poor research strategy to allow
people to choose topics
and/or discussion groups", each subject would be randomly
assigned
cussion topic.

a dis-

The experimenter then "randomly" assigned each subject a

topic by drawing (with replacement) numbered slips of paper
from a container.
In actuality, all paper slips were numbered

were assigned either the sleep

(3)

3

or 4.

Thus, all subjects

or the trimester topic (4).

Immediately after the sham drawing, subjects received a form which

requested "scheduling information".
age, sex, name, phone number,

gned topics.

On this form, subjects indicated their

local address, and also wrote down their assi-

To enhance 'expectations that a second session would be taking

place, subjects were also asked to indicate their "best days/ times" to be

scheduled for the "second session".
Next, the experimenter said that because "many of last semester's

subjects had been unclear about what would actually transpire in the second
session", it had been decided that "this semester" subjects would read a

transcript of a discussion or an interview from the previous study in order
to "get a better idea of the second session".

The experimenter added that

"because the interviews were shorter than the discussions", subjects would
read interview transcripts.

After explaining that "20 interview transcripts'

had been selected for presentation to subjects, the experimenter gave each
subject one of 16 different versions of a transcript (persuasive message,
see below)

.

These 16 versions represented all combinations of the likeabi-

lity, arguments, topic, and message rendition conditions of the experiment
(see below).

Subjects were told to read the transcripts and to signal their
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completion by placing the transcripts face down.

After distributing the

transcripts, the experimenter went into an
adjoining room and started a

stop-clock.

By observing subjects through a one-way
mirror,

the experimenter

recorded the time that each subject spent reading
his/her transcript.

After all subjects had finished reading, the
experimenter returned
and collected the transcripts, remarking. "Well,

better idea of the interview situation".

I

hope that gives you a

The experimenter next said that

it was important to assess subjects' preliminary
opinions on the various

discussion topics.
(see Appendix

I)

cussion topics.

Each subject then received a one-page questionnaire

on which they indicated their opinions on the various dis-

Depending upon whether

a subject had

been given a trans-

cript containing a sleep message or a trimester message, opinion
statement
3 or 4

the

corresponded exactly to the position which had been

advocated in

subject's transcript.
Next, the experimenter explained that since "a secondary focus of the

research concerned how people react to the opinions of others", subjects

would complete

a

questionnaire which asked for their reactions to the

interviews they had just read.

This questionnaire (see Appendix i) contained

the remaining dependent measures (described below).

After completing the

questionnaire, subjects were thanked for participating and were told that
they would be recontacted for the "second session".

Approximately 10 days after the first (and only) session (mean delay =
10,39 days;

range = 8 to 15 days), subjects were telephoned by an experi-

menter who was blind

to

their experimental condition.

subject, thi experim.ent :;r stated:

Upon reaching a
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Hello, (subject's name).
I am (name).
I am calling
for Project CONTACT, a student survey project
being
conducted by a survey research group in the psychology department. This semester, we've been
polling
students about how they feel about various aspects
of
UMass life.
Tonight we are focussing on students'
feelings about various aspects of the University
structure and, in addition, on students' feelings and
opinions about physical and psychological well-being.
You have been randomly selected as part of tonight's sample. Your name will not be used in any
way and your responses are confidential. Would you
mind answering a few questions for us?

After the subject had agreed or declined (N=0) to participate, the
experimenter introduced the first
structure.

5

survey questions as dealing with University

The fifth of these assessed subjects' agreement with the tri-

mester proposition.

Next, five more questions, dealing with "physical

and psychological well-being", were introduced and the fifth of these
items assessed subjects' agreement with the sleep proposition.

instrument appears in its entirety in Appendix

I

.

The phone

After administering

the complete instrument, the experimenter probed for suspicion by asking
the subject if he/she had participated in any "similar surveys" during
the semester.

Finally, the subject was thanked for cooperating.

After completing the entire experiment (laboratory session plus phone
contact), each subject received a letter which described the experiment's
true purposes and hypotheses, and discussed the deceptions which had been

employed.

The letter also invited subjects to

m.eet

with the senior expe-

rimenter if they desired to discuss the experiment further.

Interview Transcripts
The transcipts began with an interviewer asking an interviewee (hereinafter referred to as communicator) for background information.

Tlie

(male) communicator was portraj^ed as a University administrator who worked
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with undergraduates in various student organizations.

After the communi-

cator either praised or insulted undergraduates
in response to a question

from the interviewer, the interviewer mentioned
the communicator's

(sup-

posedly) assigned topic (sleep or trimester)
and asked him to state his

overall position on the topic.

The communicator stated either that he

thought people should sleep fewer than

8

hours per night or that the Uni-

versity should switch to a trimester system.

Next, the communicator pro-

vided various arguments supporting his overall position.

Finally, the

interviewer thanked the communicator "for participating in the interview".
The complete set of interview transcripts employed in the
experiment

appear in Appendix II.
Independent Variables

Perceive d future consequences.

The perception of future consequences

was manipulated by whether or not subjects received a persuasive message
(interview transcript) on the same topic that they, themselves, anticipated

being interviewed about and discussing at the (hypothetical) second experimental session.

Approximately half of those subjects assigned the sleep

topic received a sleep message (high consequences) while half received a

trimester message (low consequences) and approximately half

the subjects

assigned the trimester topic received a trimester message (high consequences)

while half received

a sleep message

Comraunicatcr likeability

.

ITie

(low consequences)

communicator (interviewee) either praised

or insulted undergraduates upon being asked by the interviewer,

you like working with undergraduates?"
& Chaiken,

1975).

(cf., Jones

& Brehm,

"Hov; do-

1967; Eagly

In the likeable condition, zhe ccuimunicatcr ans-wered:

let.
Well, as a matter of fact. I really enlcy it
VJhen I first started m.y job here at the University

49

was a little apprehensive about
the idea of
working so much with undergraduates.
Over the
years, however, I've realized that my
apprehension
was unjustified.
The undergraduates who I've met
both in my work with various student
organizations
and in other settings as well strike me
as being
pretty responsible and mature. They're
really
concerned, I think, with their role in society.
I don't know of course, but
sometimes I think
that the public too often underestimates
the
ability and maturity of today's college student.
They just don't give undergraduates enough
credit.
Anyway, it's no wonder that I continue to do
the
work that I do... For me, working with undergraduates
has been pretty rewarding.
I

In the unlikeable condition, the communicator
answered:

Well, as a matter of fact, I don't really enjoy it
very much, \n\en I first started my job here at the
University I was a little apprehensive about the idea
of working so much with undergraduates.
Over the
years, I'm sorry to say, I think my apprehension has been
justified.
The undergraduates who I've met both
in my work with various student organizations and in
other settings as well strike me as being pretty irresponsible and immature too. They're really unconcerned, I think, with their role in society.
I don't
know of course but sometimes I think that the public
too often overestimates the ability and maturity of
today's college student.
They give undergraduates
more credit than they deserve. Anyway, sometimes I
wonder why I continue to do the work I do... For me,
working with undergraduates really hasn't been very
rewarding.

Topic

.

To provide an internal replication, two topics

and the trimester (vs. semester) system

—

were employed.

—

sleep habits

The position

advocated in the sleep messages was "People should sleep much less than
the typical average of 8 hours per night", and the position advocated in

the trimester messages was "The University should switch from its current

two-semester system to a trimester system".

after pretesting

Thesa statements were selected

with 50 pilot subjects who indicated their agreement (15-

point agree/disagree scale) with a total of 23 opinion statements on a

variety of topics.

The major criterion for selection of the
two opinion

statements was that they have similar mean
opinion ratings falling in the
"disagree moderately" range (10 to 12) of the
agreement scale.

Additional

criteria Included choosing statements whose opinion
ratings had relatively
low variability and statements for which
supportive arguments could be

constructed.

Number of arguments a nd message rendition

argumentation presented

which

8

amount of persuasive

supporting the messages'

Six arguments were constructed for each topic.

basic arguments for the sleep topic were:
less than

Tlie

to subjects was varied by preparing messages

contained either six or two arguments

overall position.

.

hours,

(2)

(1)

The

successful people sleep

via short naps, REM sleep can be maximized,

(3)

long sleep periods are associated with heart disease and other ailments,
(4)

people who have shifted from

feel better,

8

or more to less than 8 hours of sleep

sleep time varies from culture to culture and is thus

(5)

arbitrary, and (6)

people who sleep

6

rather than

in experiments measuring problem solving skills.
the basic arguments were:

(1)

8

hours perform better

For the trimester topic,

the trimester system reduces the campus

population at any one point during the year, thereby creating an intimate
atmosphere, (2)

the trimester allows greater academic individuality

which enables sttidents to graduate earlier,
the freedom

months,

(4)

the trimester provides

to -^^acation during seasons other that the traditional summer

the trimester is economical since University buildings are

used year round, (5)

since

(3)

the trim

ter reduces competition for part-time jobs

student vacations occur at different times, and

(6)

the trimester

operates successfully at the University of Michigan where both faculty
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and students report liking it.
For each message topic, two renditions
of the six arguments' version

and two renditions of the two arguments'
version were prepared.

For the
|

six arguments' messages,

the two renditions contained the same
six argu-

ments but presented them

in two different (randomly selected)
orders.

For the two arguments' messages, the two
renditions each contained two
different arguments, drawn randomly from the
pool of six.

Measuring Instruments
Opinions

.

At the laboratory session, subjects gave their
opinions on

the two experimental topics by indicating their
agreement with the statements,

"People should sleep much less that the typical average
of

8

hours per

night", and "The University should switch from its current
two-semester

system to a trimester system".

Each of these ratings was made on a 15-

point scale whose anchors were labelled "agree strongly" and
"disagree
strongly".

Over the phone (approximatey) 10 days later, subjects indicated

their agreement with the statements, "People should sleep less than the

usual

8

hours per night", and "The University should change over to a

trimester

system".

These statements

were read to subjects by the experi-

menter and subjects responded orally with respect to a 5-point scale whose
endpoints were "definitely agree" and "definitely disagree".
C ognitive responses to the persuasive message

.

To provide a gross

measure of the cognitive effort expended by subjects in processing the
content of the persuasive message, the time that each subject spent reading

his/her interview transcript was recorded.
On the first page of the second extJerimental questionnaire (see Appendix

I),

subjects were asked to "List below your thoughts and ideas about
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what the person who was interviewed
said during his/her interview".

Belc
Low

this statement were a series of
lines with the word "Idea" appearing
at
the left margin of each line.
Subjects were allotted 3 minutes
for this
task.
Unlike scoring procedures employed in
similar thought-listing tasks
(e.g., Greenwald, 1968; Osterhouse
& Brock. 1970), subjects 'statements
were

coded by two independent raters according
to the following scheme:

Each

statement was categorized as either a
"Communicator-oriented" or a "Message-

oriented" thought, and, in addition, as either
a positively, negatively,
or neutrally valenced thought.

Statements which could not be clearly as-

signed to one of the six resulting categories
were placed in a residual
"other" category.

A statement was scored as

a

communicator-oriented thought if it clearly

referred to the communicator rather than the topic and/or
content of the
persuasive message and, further, was not judged to be
an inference about
the communicator's traits/states based on the subjects'
impression/evalu-

ation of the message.
(C+) or negative (C-)

Communicator-oriented thoughts were scored positive
if they reflected positively or negatively on the

communicator (e.g., "He was very polite", "He seems very relaxed" vs.
"He was a little close-minded", "He seems like a bitter person").

Communi-

cator thoughts which were judged neither positive nor negative (e.g.,
"Sounds like a liberal parent", "Hesitant about talking about self") or

which restated information presented via the likeability manipulation (e.g.,
"He likes working with undergraduates", "He thinks undergraduates are imma-

ture") were scored as neutral (Co).

A statement was considered
referred to

so-ie

a

message-oriented

thought if it clearly

aspect of the content and/or topic of the message, or if
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it was judged to be an inference about the
communicator derived from

subjects' perceptions of the message (e.g., "He
knew a lot about his
topic").
(M-)

Message-oriented thoughts were scored positive (W-) or
negative

if they reflected general approval or
disapproval of the message

(e.g., "Person took a good stand" vs. "I disagreed
with what he had to

say") or specific agreement or disagreement with
particular arguments
(e.g.. The economic advantages of the trimester agree
with me"

question REM training").

vs.

"I

Counterarguments (e.g., "Biological needs differ

from person to person") and statements challenging the logic or
validity
of the message (e.g., "Reasons for trimester not sound logically")

were thus included in the M- thought category.

Neutral message-oriented

thoughts (Mo) included restatements of the message contents (e.g., "He
desires trimester") and statements which were judged neither postive nor

negative (e.g., "He based much of what he said from things he had read
about", "REM can be controlled which

I

didn't know").

Statements which could not be clearly placed into any of the above

six categories were coded as "other thoughts

"

(0).

"Other thoughts"

included statements referring to the interview context (e.g., Background
data

seems irrelevant", "It was simple and basic in

terras of

questions")

and statements judged ambiguous in terms of whether they referred to the
coTranunicator or to the message (e.g.,

"Person was involved in social affairs

yet attitudes didn't seem to go together").

With one exception (Other thoughts)
high.

Correlations (Pearson's

r)

,

inter-rater reliability was quite

between the two raters' judgments for

each of the seven categories and for the total number of thoughts coded
for each subject were:

C+:

.35,

C-:

.82,

Co:

.75, M+:

.86, M-:

.88, Mo:

.86,
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0:

.53,

total thoughts:

.97.

Source percep^_on. Subjects rated the
communicator on 15-point bipolar

adjective scales.

Positive poles of the 12 adjectives used were
warm,

knowledgeable, modest, intelligent, approachable,
competent, likeable,
trustworthy, pleasing, sincere, friendly, and
unbiased.

Message comprehension.

Subjects were asked to write down each argu-

ment that the communicator had used to support his overall
position.

An

argument was scored correct if, in the judgment of two independent
raters

(rH86), it accurately summarized one of the arguments contained in the
persuasive message.

Subjects were also asked to write down the topic and

overall position taken by the communicator.

All subjects correctly recalled

the topic of the message and all but four (retained in the analyses) correct]

specified the overall position taken in the message.
Other measures

.

On

the message topic was,

15-point scales, subjects indicated how important
the extent to which they desired tc be well informed

on the topic, how much effort they had put into reading the message, and

how interested they had been in attempting to understand the communicator's
reasons for his opinion.

Subjects also indicated whether they had spent

more time thinking about the coironunicator and his characteristics or more
time thinking about the communicator's reasons for his overall opinion

(15-point scale).

their

After completing these measures, subjects wrote down

interpretations of the study.

Tliese responses

were coded for suspi-

cion of persuasive intent and suspicion of the experiment'

'

s

ccver story.

At the completion of the delayed opinion posttesr, subjects were asked if
they had been in any "similar opinion surveys".

Subjects who at this point

or at any other time during the phone contact indicated prior familiarity
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with the opinion statements or explicitly mentioned
their earlier laboratory participation, were coded as aware of the
association between the

laboratory session and the delayed opinion posttest.
Results
In addition to the primary experimental variables of
interest (per-

ceived consequences, communicator likeability, number of persuasive
arguments, and, on opinions, time of assessment), message topic (sleep
vs.

trimester), subject sex, and message rendition (nested within levels of

topic and number of arguments) were included in preliminary data analyses.

The message rendition variable, included in the design for external validity concerns, accounted for few and, due to its nature, relatively

uninterpretable effects on the various dependent measures.

For this

reason, all reported analyses were performed collapsing over this variable.

Although the topic and sex variables also

accounted for few effects, they

were retained as factors in the reported analyses, primarily because of
the reduction in error variability which accorapanied their inclusion.

Despite random assignment to treatments and the deletion of data
from subjects over 25 years old, analysis of variance on age yielded a

number of significant effects.

4

Because the various experimental groups

could not be considered equivalent in terms of age, all further analyses

employed age as a covariate.
In summary, all reported analyses employed age as a covariate and

included subject sex and message topic as independent variables in addition
to the primaiy experimental variables.

Because of their minimal theoretical

relevance, effects involving the sex and topic variables, while noted for

ail dependent measures, are typically not described in detail.
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Check on Experimental Conditions
The information given to subjects
regarding the communicator's

attitude toward undergraduates was successful
in Influencing their perceptions of his likeability:

was

The communicator who praised
undergraduates

judged significantly more likeable <M=4.
25) than the communicator

who insulted undergraduates (M=8.80), F(l.
150)=93. 69 .£< 001.
.

Varying

the number of persuasive arguments
presented to subjects also had its

intended impact:

Subjects recalled significantly more persuasive
arguments

when they read a message containing six, rather
than two, arguments
(M=2.82 vs. M= 1.56), F(l,150)=72.
15, £<.001.

The perceived consequences variable was manipulated
by presenting

subjects with a persuasive message on a topic which was
identical to
(high consequences) or different from (low consequences)
the topic they

had been assigned to discuss and be interviewed about
at a future experi-

mental session.

All subjects correctly specified their assigned topic

and subjects in high, com.pared to low, consequences conditions
spent more
time reading the persuasive message (M=196.87 seconds vs. M=181.72
seconds),
I^(l,150)=11.84, J2.<.001; reported spending more time thinking about the

connnunicator's reasons for his opinion rather than this personal characte-

ristics (M=8.84 vs. M=7.38), F(l,150)=5.57, £<.05; and expressed a (non-

significantly) greater desire to be well informed on the topic discussed
in the message (M-6,24 vs. M=7.05), F(l,150)=1.88,4i= .17.
It is important to note that being assigned a topic

did not, in itself,

lead subjects to "strategically" moderate or shift their opinions in any

apparent way (cf., Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski,

& Petty,

1976): Two-

way Topic Received X Topic Assigned analyses of variance performed on
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subjects' initial and delayed opinions
on both the sleep and trimester
topics revealed

that the Topic Received main effect was
significant on

all four agreement measures (£'s< .05 or
smaller) while the Topic Assigned main effect was nonsignificant (all F's<
1.0)

.

The significant Topic

Received main effect on subjects' agreement
scores indicates that the

persuasive messages were successful in inducing
shifts in opinions while
the lack of a Topic Assigned main effect
indicates that simply expecting
to discuss and be interviewed about a particular
topic had no influence

on immediate or delayed agreement with either the
sleep or trimester

propositions.

Further, experimental subjects assigned the sleep topic

who received a trimester message and experimental subjects
assigned the
trimester topic who received a sleep message showed no lesser or
greater
(immediate or delayed) agreement with the sleep or trimester
propositions,
respectively, than did pilot subjects (N=50) who simply indicated their

opinions on a variety of topics (£'s> .25 or larger, Dunnetts test).

In

contrast, regardless of topic assigned, experimental subjects exposed to
a sleep message and those exposed to a trimester message indicated signi-

ficantly greater (immediate and delayed) agreement with the sleep and

trimester propositions, respectively, than did opinion-only pilot subjects

(£'s^.025 or smaller, Dunnetts test).
Opinions
Subjects indicated their opinions on the sleep and trimester topics
inunediately after message exposure and, again, approximately 10 days later.

Opinion change scores were formed by subtracting from each subjects'
(initial and delayed) opinion on his/her message topic, the mean opinion
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expressed by an internal control group:

All subjects who received a sleep

message formed an internal control group
for subjects who read a trimester
message, while all those subjects who
received a trimester message formed
an internal control group for subjects
who read a sleep message.

It should

be noted that the opinions expressed by
internal control subjects did not

differ significantly from those expressed by
the external control group of

opinion-only pilot subjects (sleep topic:

M=10.23 vs. M=10.72 for internal

and external controls, respectively, t(137)=.80,
n.s.;

trimester topic:

M=10.32 vs. M=10.54 for internal and external
controls, respectively,
t,(142) = .34, n.s.).

A five-way Sex X Topic X Consequences X Likeability X
Arguments analysis of variance (age as covariate) was performed on subjects'
initial

opinion change scores and also on their delayed opinion change
scores.

To

explore opinion change over time, a third analysis was performed on
opinion
change using time of assessment (immediate vs. delayed) as a repeated
measures factor in addition

to the above between subjects variables.

results of these three analyses are reported separately.

The

Mean opinion change

for the major experimental conditions are shown in Table 1.^

Insert Table

Initial opinion change

.

about here

1

Analysis of subjects' initial opinion change

scores yielded main effects due to communicator likeability, _F(1,150)=4.05,

£<.05, and number

of argumencs presented, F^(l,150)=4.15,£< .05:

overall basis, subjects exposed to

a

cantly greater initial oninion change

On an

likeable coinnuni cator showed signifi(11-2. AS)

than did subjects exposed
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to an unlikeable coimnunicator (M=1.58);
and. subjects exposed to six
argun^ents exhibited significantly
greater initial opinion change (M=2.72)

than did subjects exposed to only
two arguments (M=1.A2).

Confirmation of the major experimental
hypothesis required obtaining
a pattern of results on initial
opinion change such that, within high
con-

sequences conditions, the simple arguments
but not the simple

likeability

effect would be significant while, within
low consequences conditions, the
simple likeability effect but not the simple
arguments effect would be significant.

These specific simple effect predictions
generated the overall

prediction that the full analysis of variance
would yield both a Consequences

X Likeability and a Consequences X Arguments
interaction.

Although neither

of these interactions reached conventional levels
of significance in the

analysis of initial opinion change (Consequences X
Likeability F(l,150)=1.34.

£=.25; Consequences X Arguments F

(1, 150)=1. 42

the results of

.24),

.

simple effects tests were generally in accord with specific
predictions.
Thus, within high consequences conditions, subjects exposed
to six arguments

showed significantly greater initial opinion change (M =3.16) than did
subjects exposed to only cwo arguments (M=1.32), simple F(l,150)=6.
68,
2.^ .05;

while, within low consequences conditions, subjects exposed to

six arguments showed only nonsignif icantiy greater change than did subjects
exposed to only two arguments (K= 2.33 vs.
1.05, 71,3.

M=

1.52), simple

i;

(1,150) =

On the other hand, v/ithin low consequences conditions

subjects

exposed to likaable communicators showed, on a r^irginally significant
basis, greater initial opinion change (M=2.54) than did subjects exposed
CO

unlikeable corjnunicators (N=1.24), simple

£

(1,

150)=2 97
.

,

2r '09;
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while, within high consequences conditions,
subjects exposed to likeable
connnunicators showed only nonsignif icantly
greater change (M=2.40) than

did subjects exposed to unlikeable
communicators (M=1.97), simple

<
of

1.0.

FU. 150)

In Figure 1, panel A displays initial
opinion change as a function

communicator likeablility and perceived consequences
and panel B

displays initial opinion change as a function of
number of arguments

presented and perceived consequences.

Insert Figure

Delayed o pinion change

.

1

about here

The analysis of subjects' delayed opinion

change scores yielded a significant arguments, effect, F(l,150)=5.48,£<.025;
As they had on initial opinion change, subjects who read messages containing

six arguments showed significantly greater opinion change 10 days after

message exposure (M=2.36) than did subjects who had read messages containing
only two arguments (M=1.16).

The consequences main effect was also signi-

ficant in this analysis, F;(1,150)=4.19,

£<

.05:

Subjects in high conse-

quences conditions exhibited significantly greater opinion change on the

delayed posttest (M=2.20) than did subjects in low consequences conditions
(M=1.35).

The communicator likeability main effect was only marginally

significant in the analysis of delayed opinion change, F^(l,150) = 2.53,
_p=.ll:

Subjects originally exposed to a likeable comjnunicator manifested

only slightly greater opinion change on the delayed posttest

(M=2.15) than
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did subjects originally exposed to
an unlikeable communicator (M=1.30).

Opinion change over time

.

To explore opinion change over
time,

subjects' opinion change scores were
submitted to a 6-way analysis of

covariance (age as covariate) which included

5

between subjects factors

(consequences, likeability, arguments, sex,
topic) and one repeated measures factor (time of assessment).

primary interest

-

Before presenting the results of

those involving the time of assessment
variable

-

those results involving between-subj ects
factors only are briefly summarized.

The repeated

measures analysis yielded a significant arguments

effect, F(l,150)=5.52, 2<.025, a marginally
significant likeability effect,

F(l,150)=3.74, £=.06, and a marginally significant
consequences effect,
F(l, 150)= 2.71, £=.10.

Thus, ignoring time of assessment, subjects exhibited

significantly greater opinion change in response to messages
containing six,
rather than two, arguments (M=2.5A vs. M=1.29); and manifested
marginally

greater opinion change when exposed to a likeable, rather than unlikeable,

communicator (M=2.31 vs. M=1.44) or when in high, rather than low, consequences conditions (M'2.20 vs. M=1.64).
Turning to those results involving the repeated measures factor,

significant

a

time of assessment main effect, 2(1»151)=3.96, £<.05, indicated

that opinion change decreased significantly between the initial and delayed

posttest (M=2.07 vs. M=1.76>.

Assessment

X

Consequences

However, the marginally significant Time of

interaction, F(l,151)=2.15, p<.15, suggested

chat this overall tendency was limited to subjects in low consequences
conditions:

cantly over

In accord with predictions, opinion change decreased signifitii-ie

fcr low consequences

subjects (M=1.93 vs. M^l.35), simple
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F(l,15.1)=5.23. £<.05. but remained
virtually stable for high

subjects (M=2.21 vs. M=2.20),
si.ple_F(1.151X 1.0.

consequences

I^e significant decay

in opinion change for subjects in
low but not high consequences
conditions

accounts for the fact that the consequences

main effect was significant

on delayed opinion change
(£<.05) but not on initial opinion change
(^>.30)
Figure 2 displays initial and delayed
opinion change for high and low

consequences

subjects, respectively.

Insert Figure

2

about here

The above findings are qualified somewhat by
the significant Time of

Assessment X Consequences X Likeability interaction,
F(l,151)=4.00, £<.05
(see Table 2 for marginal means).

The Time of Assessment X Consequences

interaction was significant within likeable communicator
conditions,

£<.025, but nonsignificant within unlikeable conditions,
Che

communicator was likeable, high consequences

F<1.0:

When

subjects showed no

decrease in opinion change between posttests, F<1.0, while low
consequences
subjects did show a significant decrease, £^.01.
X7as

When the communicator

unlikeable, however, neither high nor low consequences

subjects exhi-

bited a significant decline in opinion change between posttests (simple

F's<1.0).

Ag the means in Table

decrease for low consequences

suggest, however, the nonsignificant

2

subjects exposed to an unlikeable communi-

cator may be due to a baseraenc effect.

Insert Table

2

Effects, involvin?^ topic and sex.

about here

The topic main effect attained
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marginal

significance. ^=.09. in the repeated
measures analysis of opinion

change and also in the separate analyses
of initial and delayed opinion
change (both £'s=.12):

Trimester messages tended to engender
greater

opinion change than did sleep messages.

In addition, the Consequences X

Likeability X Arguments X Topic interaction
was significant in the repeated
measures analysis, £<.05.

This interaction also attained significance
in

the analysis of delayed opinion change,
£= .05, and was marginally signi-

ficant in the analysis of initial opinion change,
£-.06.
the marginal means

for this interaction.

In essence,

Table

3

presents

the 4-way interaction

indicates that the opinion change findings obtained
when the topic variable

was ignored were somewhat more pronounced within
trimester message conditions
than within sleep message conditions.

In fact, although the patterning of

opinion change means was generally consistent within both topics,
simple
effects tests revealed that within sleep conditions, the primary
experi-

mental variables had no

significant

impact on opinion change.

The fact

that the consequences, likeability, and arguments manipulations exerted

little differential impact on the opinions of subjects reading sleep,

rather than trimester, messages may be due to the low overall amount of

opinion change induced by the sleep messages in comparison to the trimester
messages.

Insert Table

3

about here

As noted earlier, the patterning of initial opinion change means

obtained across topics (see Figure

J.)

proved genearlly supportive of the

prediction that the arguments manipulation would exert a stronger Impact
on the initial opinion judgments of subjects in high (vs. low) conseq;;ences
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conditions while the likeability
manipulation would exert a stronger
impact
on the initial opinion judgments
of subjects in low (vs. high)
consequences
conditions.
Figure 3. which displays initial
opinion change as a function
of likeability and consequences
(panel A) and as a function of
arguments

and consequences (panel B) for subjects
in sleep and trimester conditions

separately, indicates that while the
patterning of means obtained within

trimester conditions corresponds closely
to the patterning obtained across
topics,

the patterning obtained

consistent.

within sleep conditions is only moderately

Both across and within topics,

the likeability manipulation

tended to more strongly affect the initial
opinion
than high, consequences

subjects.

judgments of low, rather

However, as Figure

3

illustrates, and

the results of simple effects tests suggest, che
across topics finding that
the arguments manipulation more strongly affected
the initial opinion judg-

ments of high (vs.

low)

consequences subjects, is primarily due to the res-

ults obtained within trimester conditions:
the simple

£<.10;

Consequences X Arguments

and, further,

Within trimester conditions,

interaction was marginally significant,

the simple arguments effect was significant for high,

£<.05, but not low consequences

subjects, F<1.0.

In contrast, within

sleep conditions, the simple Consequences X Arguments interaction was non-

significant, F<1.0; and, further, the simple arguments effect was nonsignificant for both high and low consequences

Insert Figure

In addition to the

3

subjects (F's< 1.0).

about here

marginally significant topic main effect and the

significant Consequences X Likeability X Arguments X Topic interaction
described above, the repeated measures analysis of opinion change also
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yielded a

significant Ti.e of Assessment X Sex
X Topic interaction, a

significant Time of Assessment X
Consequences X Arguments X Topic
interaction,
and a significant Time of Assessment
X Likeability X Arguments X Topic
interaction (^•s< .05). Due to their lack
of interpretability and their

questionable theoretical relevance, these
higher-order interactions are
not discussed further.
The interested reader is referred
to Appendix

m

where the marginal means described by
these interactions appear.
Amount and Type of Time Spent Reading the
Persuasive Message

An analysis of the amount of time each subject
spent reading the
persuasive message indicated that subjects in high,
in comparison

to low.

consequences conditions spent more time reading the
persuasive message
(M=196.87 vs. M_=181.72 seconds). F(l,150)=ll.
84. £<.001.

be expected

.

Also, as would

subjects spent more time reading the message when it
contained

six. rather than two, arguments (M=216.55 vs. M=161.92
seconds). F (1,150)=

67.44, 2<.001.

On subjects' self-reports of the relative amount of time they
had

spent thinking about the communicator's characteristics versus his
arguments,

both a consequences and an arguments effect were obtained.

Subjects spent

more time thinking about the communicator's argumentation if they were in
high (vs. low) consequences conditions (M=8.84 vs. M=7.38). F(l. 150)=5
57
.

^<

.05. and when they read massages containing six,

rather than two, argu-

ments (M=9.06 vs. K=7.14), F(1.150)=10.37, £<.005.
Effects involving topic and sex

.

On the actual amount of time spent

reading the persuasive message, both the Sex X Topic and Likeability X

Topic interactions were significant (£'s<^.05).

In terms of general trends,

male subjects and subjects exposed to likeable communicators tended to
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spend more time reading trimester (vs.
sleep) messages, while female

subjects and subjects exposed to unlikeable
communicators tended to spend
more time reading sleep (vs. trimester)
messages.
Thoughts Generated by Exposure to the
Persuasive Message
For each subject, the sum of thoughts
in each of the

7

thoughts cate-

gories (C+, C-. Co, m-, M-, Mo, 0) was
computed and the resulting indices

treated by analysis of variance.

Because of its low reliability (r=.50)

and ambiguous theoretical status, findings
obtained on the "Other" thoughts

measure are not reported.
derived scores:
(2)

(1)

Analyses were also performed on the following

Total thoughts (T=IC+

+lc~

+lCo

+ZMf

+lM-

Message- oriented minus communicator-oriented thoughts
(ZMess

(2>H-

+nM-

+zlio)

thoughts (2P0S

-

(rc+

+^C-

-?Neg = (IM+

+^o)

-^Com =

+rCo)), and (3) Positive minus negative

i:C+)

-

+XC-)).^

Analyses on the communicator-oriented thoughts measures revealed
that
the consequences main effect was significant on positive thoughts,
_F(1»150)

4.95,

£<.05, neutral thoughts

,

F(l,150) = 7.96, 2<.005, and marginally

significant on negative thoughts about the communicator, _F(1,150)=3. 32,
£=.07.:

While high consequences

subjects generated more positive communi-

cator-oriented thoughts than low consequences
low consequences

subjects (M=.61 vs. M=.3A),

subjects generated more negative thoughts

and more neutral thoughts about the communicator

(11=.

(M=.90 vs. M=.5

68 vs. M=.36).

The

likeability effect vas significant on both positive communicator thoughts,
_F(1,150)=9 .83, £<'.0C5, and negative communicator thoughts, F(l,150) = 26.99,

£<.001:

Subjects exposed to a likeable, rather than unlikeable, com.munica~

tor generated more positive thoughts (M=.63 vs. M=.22) and fewer negative

thoughts (M=.25 vs. M=1.33) about the communicator.

An arguments effect
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on positive coimnunicator thoughts.
F(l,150) = 8. 44. £<.005. and
neutral
cominunicator thoughts. F(l. 150)=13.06.

2<.01, indicated that subjects

exposed to two (vs. six) arguments generated
more positive and neutral

communicator-oriented thoughts (C+: M =.60 vs.
M=.33; Co: M=.76 vs.M=.29).
On subjects' neutral communicator
thoughts, both the Consequences X Argu-

ments interaction, F(1.150)=8.15.
^<.005. and the Consequences X Likeability
X Argum.ents interaction. F(1.150) = 7.
10. £<.01. were significant.
of general trends, high consequences

In terms

subjects expressed roughly the same

number of neutral communicator thoughts,
regardless of level of arguments
or likeability.

Low consequences

subjects, however, tended to express

more neutral communicator thoughts when messages
contained two (vs. six)
arguments, and this tendency was slightly more
pronounced for subjects

exposed to likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicators.
On subjects' positive message-oriented thoughts a significant
like-

ability effect, F(l,150)=5.30, £<.05, a
_F(1,150)=10.88,

£<.001, and

a

significant arguments effect,

marginally significant consequences effect,

_F(1,150)=3.62, £=.06, were obtained:

More positive message-oriented

thoughts were expressed by subjects exposed to likeable (vs. unlikeable)

communicators (M=1.04 vs. M=.64); by subjects exposed to six (vs. two)
arguments (M=1.12 vs. M=.60); and by subjects in high (vs. low) consequences

conditions

(M=1.01 vs. M=.71).

On neutral message-oriented thoughts, only

the Consequences X Likeability X Arguments interaction was significant,
F_

(1,150)=4. 39,

£^.05.

High consequences subjects generated approximately

the same number of neutral message thoughts, regardless of likeability or number

of arguments received, while low consequences subjects tended to express

more neutral message thoughts if exposed to a likeable ccmnunicator who
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presented two (vs. six) arguments,
or if exposed to an unlikeable
co.nunicator who presented six (vs. two)
arguments.

An analysis of the sum of
message-oriented minus communicator-oriented
thoughts index yielded a marginally
significant consequences main effect,
F(L.150)-3.66, £=.06, indicating
that high consequences subjects
generated
relatively more message-oriented than
communicator-oriented thoughts (M=1.25)
in comparison to low consequences
subjects (M=.46).

mm

effects due to likeabllity, F(l. 150)=6
74
.

ments. F(l,150)=11.49,

^.001 were

.

On the same measure,

£<.01, and the number

also obtained:

of argu-

Subjects expressed rela-

tively more message-oriented than
communicator-oriented thoughts when the

communicator was likeable, rather than unlikeable
(M=1.41 vs. M=.17), and

when six, rather than two, arguments were received
(M=1.43 vs. M=.26).

On

the sum of positive minus negative thoughts
index, a consequences effect,

F(l,150)=4.68, £j^.05, and a likeability effect. F(l,150)=14.56,
2<.001, were
obtained:

Low consequences subjects generated more negative than
positive

thoughts (M=-.79) while high consequences subjects generated
an equivalent

number of positive and negative thoughts (M=0.00); and subjects
e:cposed to

unlikeable communicators expressed more negative than positive thoughts
(M=-1.34) while subjects

exposed to likeable communicators generated more

positive thoughts (M=.39).
Effects involving topic and sex
sleep, messages,

.

Subjects exposed to trimester (vs.

expressed significantly fewer negative message-oriented

thoughts, £<^.05, significantly more neutral message thoughts, £<.05, and

marginally more positive message-oriented thoughts, £=.07.

The Arguments

X Topic interaction was significant on positive message-oriented thoughts,
2_^01, and on total thoughts generated, £^.05.

Given trimester messages,

more positive message thoughts were expressed by subjects exposed to six
(vs.

two) arguments, while given sleep messages,

the number of positive
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message thoughts expressed was unaffected
by number of arguments received.
With respect to total thoughts, given
sleep messages, more thoughts were
generated in response to messages containing
two (vs. six) arguments

while given trimester messages, the total
number of thoughts expressed
was unaffected by the arguments variable.

On a few of the thoughts mea-

sures, higher order effects involving the
topic and/or sex variables were

also obtained.

Due to their minimal relevance they are
not discussed.

Message Comprehension
In addition to a significant manipulation
check indicating greater

argument recall for subjects reading messages containing
six, rather than
two, arguments,

£<.001, the analysis on

the recall measure yielded a

consequences main effect, F(l,150)=9.28, £<.005:

High consequences

subjects recalled significantly more arguments (M=2.40)
than did low con-

sequences subjects (M=1.98).

However, the significant Consequences X

Arguments interaction, F(l, 150)=8. 00, 2<.005 indicated that the tendency
for high (vs. low) consequences subjects

to recall more arguments was

most pronounced for messages containing six (vs. two) persuasive arguments.
Effects Involving topic and sex.

Subjects recalled more arguments

when they read trimester, rather than sleep messages, 2<.001. In addition,
an Arguments X Topic interaction, £<.005, indicated that the overall

tendency for subjects exposed to six, rather than two, arguments to recall
riore

persuasive arguments was most evident for subjects receiving trimester

(vs. sleep) messages.

Finally, the Sex X Topic and Sex X Arguments X

Topic interactions were significant on argument recall (£'s^.05) but will
not be described due to their minimal relevance.
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Percepti on of the Communicator

A factor

analysis (varimax rotation) of
subjects' bipolar source

ratings yielded two rotated factors
(see Table

Factor

1,

4

for factor loadings).

which accounted for 55.8 percent of
the total variance, was

labelled "Communicator Attractiveness".
this factor (factor loadings

>

Variables loading highly on

included warm/cold, likeable/unlikeable,

.60)

pleasing/annoying, friendly/unfriendly,
approachable/unapproachable, and
modest/arrogant.

Factor

2.

which accounted for 10.2 percent of the
variance,

was labelled "Communicator Expertise".

Source traits loading highly on

this factor included knowledgeable/unknowledgeable,
intelligent/unintelligent, and competent/incompetent.

Analyses were performed

using subjects'

attractiveness and expertise facotr scores as
dependent variables.

The

trustworthy, sincere, and unbiased scales, which
failed to load highly and/
or distinctively on either factor, were analyzed
separately.

Insert Table
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The likeable (vs. unlikeable) communicator was perceived
as more

attractive (M= -.68 vs. M+.75), F(l,150)=131.98, £<.001;
(M= -.26 vs. M= +.24), F(l,150)=11.94,

vs. M = 6.96),

F

F;(1,150)=10.20,

£<.005;

21,00,

£<.001.

(1,150) =24.48,

£<

more expert

.001; more trustworthy (M=5.06

2<.00i; more sincere (M=4.70

vs.

M=6.51),

and less biased (M=7.06 vs. M=9.84), _F(1,150) =

A consequences main effect on sincerity,

1^(1,

150)=3 .99

£<^.05, showed that high consequences subjects perceived the communicator
as more sincere than did low consequences subjects (M=5.20 vs. M=5.84).

The Likeability

X Arguments: interaction was also significant on the since-

rity ratings, _F(1,15C)=5.54,

£<

.05,

and indicated that the tendency to
1
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regard the likeable (vs. unlikeable)
coMnunicator as .ore sincere was
most pronounced for subjects
exposed to two (vs. six)
persuasive arguments.
Finally, the Consequences X
Likeability interaction on the

unbiased scale, F(l,150)= 6.08.
^<.05. suggested that the overall tendency
to perceive the likeable (vs.
unlikeable) conununicator as less
biased was
most evident for low (vs. high)
consequences subjects.
Effects involv iag_^o2i^and^

The Arguments X Topic interaction

was significant on subjects' expertise
factor scores, 2<.05:

Given tri-

mester messages, the coinmunicator presenting
six (vs. two) arguments was
perceived as more expert;

while given sleep messages, perceptions
of

expertise were unaffected by the arguments
variable.

On the trustworthi-

ness scale, the Consequences X Likeability
X Arguments X Topic, the Sex

X Consequences X Arguments, and the Sex X
Consequences X Arguments X Topic
interactions were significant (£'s<.05); and on
the unbiased scale, the
Sex X Consequences X Arguments

X Topic interaction was significant
(£(^.05).

Because of their minimal importance, these effects
are not discussed.

Other Dependent Variables
Subjects who read messages containing six, as opposed to two,
persuasive arguments, rated the topic discussed in the message as more
important,

£<'.001, reported a greater desire to be well informed on the message topic,

£^

.001, and reported exerting more effort in reading the message,

£<

.05.

No other effects involving the primary experimental variables were signi-

ficant on these measures and no effects were obtained on subjects' reported

interest in understanding the communicator's reasons for his overall position,
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Mfe^t^nvolvin^^topi^a^^^^

Overall, subjects reading
trimester

messages rated the message topic
as .ore important than did
subjects
reading sleep messages.
.005.
However, the Consequences X Topic
interaction. ^^.05. indicated that this
overall tendency was limited to
subjects in low consequences conditions:

lihereas low consequences

subjects rated the topic as more
important when they received a trimester
(vs.

sleep) message, high consequences
subjects rated the message topic

as somewhat important,

regardless of which message topic was
received.

On the topic importance ratings,
the Sex X Arguments and Sex X Arguments

X Topic interactions were also significant
(£'s<.05 and < .01
tively).

.

respec-

Finally, the Sex X Topic interaction was
significant on subjects'

desires to be well informed on the message
topic

,£<.05;

and the Sex

X Consequences X Likeability X Topic interaction
was significant on subjects' effort ratings,

£<

.05.

Due to their lack of theoretical interest,

these latter effects are not described.

Correlational Findings
Partial correlations (controlling for age) between both initial
and
delayed opinion change and the remaining dependent measures are
shown in
Table

5

for the total sample and for high and low consequences conditions

separately

Insert Table
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Correlations between the various source ratings and opinion change

were generally low and nonsignificant with the exception of subjects'
expertise ratings:

Greater perceived expertise was associated with greater

initial opinion change for all subjects, and significantly associated with
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delayed change for high, but not low,
consequences subjects.
For high consequences subjects,
number of arguments recalled was
positively and significantly associated
with both Initial and delayed
opinion change.
For low consequences subjects,
argument recall was not
significantly related to (initial or delayed)
opinion change.

Correlations between the two opinion change
measures and subjects'

communicator-oriented thoughts (C-h.C-,Co) were
generally low in magnitude and
nonsignificant.

On the other hand, subjects' positive
and negative

message-oriented thoughts tended to be positively
and negatively related
to opinion change, respectively.

and

The correlations between these indices

initial opinion change were significant within
high consequences

conditions but marginal or nonsignificant within
low consequences conditions.
The total thoughts index bore little relationship
to initial opinion change
but was significantly related to

delayed change when all subjects were

considered and also within high, but not low, consequences
conditions.
Interestingly,

this measure was negatively related to delayed opinion

change with lesser change associated with a greater number of
expressed
thoughts.

The message-oriented minus communicator-oriented thoughts
index

was only weakly related to opinion change, no doubt because this index
combined positive and negative message-oriented thoughts

which,

dually, bore opposite relationships with opinion change.

Tlie

indivi-

sum of

positive minus negative thoughts index was significantly related to initial
and delayed opinion change for the entire sample and also within high,

but not low, consequences conditions:

To the extent that subjects gene-

rated positive (vs. negative) thoughts, they exhibited greater opinion
change.
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The tine that subjects spent reading
the message was positively

related to opinion change, although
the relationship was low in
magnitude
and reached significance only with
delayed opinion change when data
from
all subjects were considered.

Subjects' self-reports of the amount
of

time they had spent thinking about the
communicator's characteristics

versus his argumentation was nonsignif
icantly related to initial opinion
change;

but. for all subjects and within high,
but not low. consequences

conditions, significantly more delayed opinion
change was associated with

more time spent thinking about the communicator's
argumentation.

Opinion

change was not related to subjects' reported
interest in reading the message or the effort they reported expending while
reading the message.
the other hand, subjects'

On

topic importance ratings and their reported

desire to be well informed on the message topic did
relate significantly
to opinion change:

Higher perceived topic importance and a greater desire

to be well informed on the message topic were associated
with greater

initial and delayed opinion change.
To further explore the cognitive mediation of opinion change
for sub-

jects in high and low consequences conditions, respectively, four mulciple

regression problems were performed.

Problems

high consequences subjects (N=89) and problems
low consequences subjects (N=94)

variable in problems

1

and

variable in problems

2

and 4.

3

.

and

1

3

2

employed data from

and A utilized data from

Initial opinion change was the criterion

while delayed opinion change was the criterion
The following 11 predictor variables were

included in each of the four regression problems:

Age, time spent reading

the message, self- reported time spent thinking about the communicator

versus the communicator's argumentation, attractiveness factor sources,
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expertise factor scores, nuinber of arguments
recalled, number of positive

communicator-oriented thoughts, number of negative
communicator -oriented
thoughts,

number of positive message-oriented
thoughts, number of negative

message-oriented thoughts, and sum of positive
minus negative
A.

sumrr^ary of

thoughts.^

the results of these regression problems
appears in Table 6.

Insert Table
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Predicti on of initial opinion charge

For high consequences subjects,

.

the only significant predictor of initial opinion
change was the number
of positive message-oriented thoughts expressed.
_p<.05.

contributed to the prediction equation on

a

Variables which

marginally significant basis

(£'s<.ll or smaller) included positive communicator-oriented thoughts,
negative message-oriented thoughts, and number of arguments recalled.

Within high consequences conditions, greater initial opinion change was
primarily associated

with a greater number of positive thoughts about

the message, a lesser number of negative message thoughts, a lesser number
of positive communicator-oriented thoughts, and greater argument recall.

For low consequences subjects,

the only variables which contributed

significantly (or niarginally significantly, for that matter) to the prediction of initial opinion change were subjects' age. p<.005, and perceived communicator expertise.

j>

< .05:

Initial opinion change was positively

associated to subjects' age and positively associated with perceived
expertise.

Prediction of delayed opinion change

.

For high consequences subjects,

the only variable which significantly predicted delayed opinion change

1
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was the number of arguments recalled,
_p <. 05

For low consequences

.

subjects, variables which contributed
significantly to the predicion of
delayed opinion change included age,_p<
.01, positive communicator-

oriented thoughts,

05, and positive message-oriented thoughts

.

_p<. 05.

Thus, within high consequences conditions,
greater delayed opinion

change was primarily associated with
greater argument recall;

while,

within low consequences conditions, greater
delayed opinion change was
primarily associated with increased age, and
a greater number of positive message-oriented thoughts and a fewer
number of positive communica-

tor-oriented thoughts generated at the laboratory
session.
Because argument recall was a significant predictor
of delayed

opinion change within high, but not low, consequences
conditions and
thus a potential mediator of the significant
consequences main effect

obtained on delayed opinion change
as a

(p <r.05),

argument recall was entered

covariate (in addition to age) in an analysis of covariance on

delayed opinion change.

This analysis revealed that covarying on argu-

ments recalled diminished the magnitude of the consequences main effect,
F(l,148) = 2.18,

£

= .14.

Discussion

In the experiment, subjects read a persuasive m.essage under either

high or low perceived consequences conditions:

While some subjects

(high consequences) read a message concerning the same topic which they

anticipated discussing and expressing their views on at a future experimental session, oLher subjects (low consequences) read a message concer-

ning a dif f eren

1:

topic.

The persuasive message was attributed to either
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unlikeable communicator who presented
either six or two

arguments supporting his overall position.

The major experimental

'

hypothesis was that the amount of argumentation
provided would have a
greater impact on the initial opinion change
shown by subjects in high,
in comparison to low, consequences
conditions, while the communicator's

likeability or unlikeability would exert a
greater impact on the initial

opinion change shown by subjects in low, in
comparison to high, consequences conditions.
The results obtained on subjects' initial opinion
change scores

were generally compatible with the above hypothesis:

Although

the

overall differences between high and low consequences
conditions were

statistically weak (neither the Consequences X Likeability
nor Consequences X Arguments interaction reached a conventional level
of significance in the analysis of variance), simple effects tests shov;ed
that

within high perceived consequences conditions, the simple argum.ents
effect was significant (£

< .05)

nonsignificant (F<1.0);

whereas, within low perceived consequences

while the simple likeability effect was

conditions, the simple likeability effect was marginally
(£ =

.09) while the

si.sTiif iccnt

simple arguments effect was nonsignificant (F<1.0).

As shown in Figure 1, high consequences subjects exhibited significantly

greater initial opinion change in response to messages containing six,
rather than two, arguments, but not in response to messages from likeable,

compared to unlikeable, comsiunicators
subjects exhibited, on a

.

On the other hand, low consequences

marginally significant basis, greater initial

opinion change in response to messages attributed to likeable, rather
than unlikeable, comraunicators

,

but not in response to messages containing
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six, compared with two, persuasive
arguments.

The above pattern of opinion change
findings was postulated to be
the result of differing information
processing strategies employed by

subjects in high and low perceived consequences
conditions, respectively.
It was reasoned that subjects in high
consequences conditions would be

highly motivated to be well informed on the
issue discussed in the persuasive message and would therefore expend the
cognitive effort required
to understand and carefully screen incoming
persuasive argumentation so

as to arrive at some correct, valid, or defensible
position on the message

topic.

Thus, it was argued that these subjects would tend
to form their

initial opinion judgments primarily on the basis of the
argumentation

provided and would tend to use information regarding the communicator's
identity only as a secondary source of information in deciding
whether
to accept the message's overall position.

In contrast,

it was reasoned

that subjects in low consequences conditions would have little stake in

being well informed on the topic of the persuasive message and would
therefore avoid expending the cognitive effort required to understand
and scrutinize incoming persuasive argumentation.

Instead, it was argued

that these subjects, opting for a relatively simple information processing

strategy, would tend to form their initial opinion judgments primarily on
the basis of the readily accessible information they possessed regarding
the communicator's identity, and would tend to be relatively unaffected

by the amount of argumentation provided in the message.
Results obtained on other dependent measures generally supported the

notion that the cognitive mediation of opinion change differed for subjects in high and low consequences conditions.

Thus, subjects in high
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(vs.

low) consequences conditions
spent significantly more time
reading

the persuasive message.

In addition, high consequences
subjects reported

spending more time during message exposure
thinking about the communicator's argumentation (vs. his personal
characteristics) than did low

consequences subjects.

Corroborating these self-reports, high (vs.

low) consequences subjects recalled
significantly more persuasive argu-

ments

Regarding subjects' cognitive responses to the
persuasive message,
although the consequences variable had no impact
on the total number
of thoughts expressed by subjects, high
consequences subjects tended to

generate relatively more message-oriented thoughts that
communicator-

oriented thoughts

in comparison to low consequences subjects
(£=.06).

It should be noted, however,

that low consequences subjects also gene-

rated more thoughts about the message than about the communicator,
no
doubt because of the low overall frequency of communicator-oriented

thoughts expressed by subjects in com.parison to message-oriented thoughts
(P =

.36 vs.

=

.58).

IiJhen

both type (message vs. communicator) and

valence (positive, negative, neutral) of thoughts were considered, no
clear-cut differences between high and low consequences conditions emerged
(see Results Section).

However, when the proportion of communicator-

oriented and message-oriented

thoughts (regardless of valence) were

analyzed, a clearer pattern emerged:

High consequences subjects produced

a significanly higher proportion of message-oriented thoughts than did

low consequences subjects

(

=

.67 vs.

=

.53, £.<.05), while low con-

sequences subjects generated a marginally higher proportion of communicator thoughts than did high consequences subjects

(?_=,39 vs.

P= 32 ,£= 11)
.

.
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Correlations between initial opinion change
and other dependent'
measures were moderately consistent with
the assumption that initial
opinion change for high consequences
subjects would be mediated primarily by their understanding of and/or
cognitive reactions to the per-

suasive message content, while initial opinion
change for low consequences

subjects would be mediated primarily by their
perceptions of the

communicator.

Argument recall, and both positive and negative
message-

oriented thoughts were significantly related
to initial opinion change

within high consequences conditions.

However, within low consequences

conditions, neither argument recall nor negative
message: thoughts

related significantly to opinion change and the
correlation between

positive message-oriented thoughts and opinion change only
approached
significance (£< .10).

Correlations between subjects' various communi-

cator-oriented thoughts (C+, C-, Co) and initial opinion change were
quite low and nonsignificant, even within low consequences conditions

where significance had been expected.

Though

somewhat discouraging,

the lack of a relationship within the latter conditions might be ascribed
to the possible insensitivity of these measures:

Of the total number

of thoughts typically elicited from subjects (H=4.57),

the proportion

of positive, negative, and neutral communicator-oriented thoughts tended
to be quite negligible

(P^_^ =

.10,

P^_ =.16, P^^ =.10).

Correlations

between subjects' source ratings and initial opinion change tended to

be low and nonsignificant.

The one exception was perceived expertise

which was significantly related to initial opinion change within both
low and high consequences conditions, though

the relationship was

somewhat stronger within low (£< .005), than within high (£<.05) consequenceb conditions.
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Multiple regression analyses also
proved to be of some worth in
exploring the cognitive mediation of
initial opinion change. Within

high consequences conditions, variables
which were significant or
marginally significant predictors of
initial opinion change represented,

with one exception (positive
coimnunicator-oriented thoughts^^)
based cognitions:

,

content

Positive message-oriented thoughts, negative
message-

oriented thoughts, and arguments recalled.

Within low consequences

conditions, however, none of these variables
predicted Initial opinion

change (p's>.28 or larger).

Instead .aside from subjects' age, perceived

communicator expertise was the only significant
predictor of initial

opinion change.
In summary, the findings on initial opinion change,
though statis-

tically weak on an overall basis, were generally consistent
with the

hypothesis that initial opinion change for subjects in high consequences
conditions would be strongly influenced by the amount of argumentation

presented but not by the communicator's likeability, while iniirial

opinion change

for subjects in low consequences conditions would be

primarily influenced by the communicator's likeability rather than by
the amount of argumentation he presented.

Further, the findings obtained

on argument recall, subjects' thoughts, and other measures, as well as

various correlational findings, generally supported the claim that high
consequences subjects would engage in a relatively detailed information

processing strategy in which content-oriented cognitions would trediate
initial opinion change, whereas low consequences subjects would engage
in a comparatively lew level information processing strategy in which

source-based cognitions would primarily mediata initial opinion change.

82

Stability of Op im'nn

rv.anc>o

^

As a secondary focus, the experiment
explored the hypothesis that

content-mediated opinion change would tend
to be more stabU over
than source-mediated opinion change.

floowing reasoning.

tim.

This hypothesis was based on th(

First, it was assumed that belief or
attitude change

with respect to some attitudinal topic
should tend to persist to the
extent that it is bolstered by other
topic-relevant cognitions.

Second,

it was reasoned that individuals who
adopt a belief primarily on the

basis of who the communicator is typically
possess fewer topic-relevant
cognitive supports for their new belief than do
individuals who adopt a

belief primarily on the basis of what the communicator
says, since the
communicator's

message typically consists of topic-related arguments or

evidence which serve to support the communicator's overall
position.
Since there seemedlittle reason to expect thac, on an initial
basis,

opinion judgments based primarily on content cues should be either
more
or less favorable to the overall position advocated in the message
than

opinion judgments based primarily on source cues, it was anticipated
that the (presumably content-mediated) initial opinion change shov/n by

high consequences

subjects would not differ appreciably from the

(presumably source-Fxcdiated)

consequences subjects.

initial opinion change exhibited by low

However, based on the hypothesis that content-

mediated change would be more stable over time than source-mediated
change, it was predicted that the opinion change expressed by low conse-

quences subjects on the delayed opinion posttest would reveal a significant decrement from that expressed on the initial opinion posttest, while
the opinion change expressed by high consequences subjects would show
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little decline between posttests

. "^"^

The opinion change findings provided
qualified support for the above

predictions.

I^e consequences main effect was
nonsignificant in the

analysis of initial opinion change
(£>.30) but was significant in the
analysis of delayed opinion change
2.

.05):

As illustrated in Figure

iimnediately after message exposure, subjects
in high and low conse-

quences conditions exhibited roughly equal
amounts of opinion change,

while (approximately) 10 days later, high
consequences subjects manifested
significantly greater change than did low
consequences subjects.

Further,

although the Time of Assessment X Consequences
interaction only approached

marginal significance (£<.15) in the repeated measures
analysis of
opinion change, simple effects tests showed that opinion
change decreased

significantly between posttests for subjects in low consequences
conditions,
but remained virtually stable for subjects in high consequences
conditiors.

Qualifying this finding somewhat, a significant Tine of Assessment X

Likeability X Consequences interaction on opinion change indicated that
the predicted differential persistence of opinion change for high and

low consequences subjects, respectively

held only for subjects

to messages attributed to likeable communicators.

was

exposed

When the communicator

unlikeable, neither high nor low consequences subjects exhibited a

significant decrease in opinion change between posttests.

Though the

failure to observe a significant decay in opinion change for low conse-

quences

subjects exposed to unlikeable communicators is somewhat dis-

couraging, close inspection of Table

have been due to

a

3

suggests that this failure nay

basement effect stemming from the fact that initial

opinion change in this condition

w£:s

extremely low.
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As noted earlier, the results on initial
opinion change and other

measures as well as the results of multiple
regression analysis using
initial opinion change as the criterion
variable were generally consistent with the notion that initial opinion
change would be primarily

mediated by content-based cognitions within
high consequences conditions
and by source-based cognitions within low
consequences conditions.
Thus, the (tentative) finding that opinion
change tended to decline

significantly over time for low consequences subjects
but not for high
consequences subjects is generally consistent with the
hypothesis chat

content-mediated (initial) opinion change would be more
persistent than

source-mediated (initial) opinion change.
The results of multiple regression analyses using delayed
opinion

change as the criterion variable revealed a different pattern
of prediction results from that obtained when initial opinion change was the

criterion variable.

Within high consequences conditions, the only sig-

nificant predictor of delayed opinion change was the number of arguments
recalled

—

a set of content- related cognitions summarizing subjects'

retention of the communication content.

oriented thoughts

—

Positive and negative message-

a set of content-related

cognitions primarily

reflecting subjects' cognitive reactions to the communication content

—

were not good predictors of delayed opinion change (£'s> .61 and p. 20,
respectively), though they had predicted initial opinion change.

Within

low consequences conditions, however, age, positive communicator-oriented

thoughts (see footnote 10), and positive message-oriented thoughts were

significaat predictors of delayed opinion change (2.'s<.05).

Neither

argument recall nor perceived expertise, a variable which had predicted
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initial opinion change (£<.05).were
good predictors of delayed
opinion
change (£'s> .29 and > .18, respectively).
These regression findings are
interesting with regard to understanding
persistence effects in persuasion.
For both high and low consequences
subjects, delayed opinion change
(unlike initial change) could, to

son,e

extent, be predicted from subjects'
content-oriented cognitions, although
for high consequences subjects,
such cognitions reflected thei r
retention
of the communication content
(i.e. arguments) while for low
consequences

subjects, such cognitions reflected,
for the most part, their cognitive

reactions to the communication content
(i.e. positive message-oriented
thoughts).

Still, opinion change tended to decline
between posttests for

low consequences subjects but remained
stable for high consequences
subjects.

These findings suggest that, contrary to those
who have empha-

sized the greater importance of recipient
generated responses.in explaining

persistence effects (cf., Greenwald, 1967), the recipient's
retention
of communication content may play a larger role
than the recipient's cog-

nitive reactions to communication content, in determining the
perslntence
of opinion change.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the

significant consequences main effect on delayed opinion change (F(l,150)=

£<.05) was considerably reduced

4.19,

was entered as

a

covariate (F(l,

148)=!''.

in strength when argument recall
.

18

,

£=.14).

Comrimnicator Likeabilitv and Opinion Change

As noted earlier, the communicator's likeability had a stronger

impact on Iritial opinion change within low (vs. high) consequences conditions.

Houever, it was also true that on au overall basis, likeable

communicators induced significantly greater initial opinion change chan

86

did unlikeable communicators.
It was proposed that the impact
of communicator cues on
(initial)

opinion chnage may often reflect the
operation of relatively simple
rules or heuristics which guide the
message recipient's decision to
accept (or reject) the communicator's
overall position.

With regard to

the likeability cue, it was suggested
that individuals may often accept

(reject) the position advocated by a
likeable (unlikeable) con«,mnicator

because of the simple rule or heuristic
that "individuals generally agree
(disagree) with people they like (dislike)".

It was also noted, however,

that agreement with a likeable communicator
might also (or in addition)
be the product of other mechanisms, such
as a desire to identify with a

liked source, a need to maintain cognitive
consistency, or through a

simple conditioning

process.

Because the experiment was not designed

to discriminate between these source
attractiveness mechanisms,

they all

remain possible explanations for the likeability effects obtained
in the

present study.

In interpreting the results on opinion change and other

measures, however, some care should be exercised since,

in the present

study, the likeable bommunicator was viewed not only as more attractive

than his unlikeable counterpart, but also as more expert, sincere, trust-

worthy, and unbiased.
on various

Thus,

the impact of the likeability manipulation

dependent measures cannot be construed as reflecting the sole

impact of source attractiveness, unconfounded by other source dimensions.

Accompanying the significant impact of likeability on intial opinion
change, it was also found that subjects exposed to likeable (vs. unlikeable)

communicators generated mere positive and fewer negative thoughts about
the communicator, more positive message-oriented

thoughts, more message-
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oriented thap comTnunicator-oriented
thoughts, and more positive
than
negative thoughts (regardless of
orientation). That subjects exposed
to likeable (vs. unlikeable)
coinmunicators generated more
positive

message-oriented thoughts, suggests that,
in addition to the attractiveness mechanisms noted above, the
heightened persuasiveness of the likeable
communicator might also have been the
product of subjects'
positive
cognitive reactions to his message. The
lack of a likeability main effect
on argument recall, time spent reading
the message, or subjects' self-

reports of the time they spent thinking
about the communicator's argumen-

tation (vs. his personal characteristics)
suggests that, in accord with

previous research (Norman, 1976; Horai, Naccari,
& Rothbart,

1971),

&

Fatoullah, 1974; Snyder

the impact of likeability on initial opinion
change

cannot plausibly be attributed to any tendency
for subjects to differentially attend to or comprehend the content of
the persuasive coirmunication.

Although communicator likeability exerted a significant impact
on
initial opinion change, it had only a weak impact on delayed
opinion change
,(£=.11).
^Hr-^the

However, likeability did not interact with time of assess.neni-

repeated measures analysis of opinion change (F< 1.0) which yielded

a marginally significant likeability main effect (£=.06).

Regardless of

time of assessment, then, the likeable communicator tended to induce

somewhat greater opinion change than did the unlikeable comm.unicator
However, the fact that the likeability effect did dissipate somewhat

between opinion posttestSj is consistent with the observation that source
effects tend to erode over time (cf., Cook
Greenwald, 197A>.

& Flay,

Note

3;

Giliig &

Since in the present study, the likeability manipulation

seemed to have a lesser impact on variables presumed to

reflect subjects'
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processing of the persuasive message
(e.g., argument recall,
.essageoriented thoughts) and a greater impact
on other variables (e.g..
communicator-oriented thoughts, other source
ratings), the fact that the
likeability effect dissipated somewhat
over time is also consistent with
the previously discussed hypothesis
that source-mediated opinion change

tends to be less persistent than
content-mediated opinion change.

Amount of Argument ation Received and
Persuasion
In the experiment, the amount of
persuasive argumentation provided
to subjects had an immediate and lasting
impact on opinion change.

The

arguments main effect was significant on initial
opinion change, delayed

opinion change, and was also significant in the
repeated measures analysis
of opinion change:
to six (vs.

Subjects showed greater opinion change

two) persuasive arguments.

vrhen

exposed

While (as predicted) arguments

interacted (marginally) with the consequences variable on
initial opinion
change, it did not interact with communicator likeability;
and did not

interact with either likeability or perceived consequences on
delayed

opinion change.
That the arguments effect on opinion change was, in fact, due to
the amount of argumentation received, rather than some other variable
(e.g., message length, effort expended reading the message) seems fairly

clear in the present study.

The arguments effect on opinion change was

accompanied by a significant impact on argument recall.

Further, covarying

on argument recall (in addition to age) greatly reduced the strength of
the arguments effect on opinion change so that it was rendered marginally

significant in an analysis of initial opinion change (o^=.14), nonsignificant in any analysis of delayed opinion change (F^^l.O), as well as
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nonsignificant in a repeated measures
analysis of opinion change
(^=.21).
In addition to its impact on
opinion change and argument
recall,
the amount of argumentation
provided had a significant
impact on a number
of other dependent measures:
Subjects exposed to six (vs. two)
persuasive

arguments spent more time reading the
message, reported spending more
time thinking about the communicator'^
arguments (vs. his personal characteristics), generated more message
oriented than communicator-oriented
thoughts, expressed a greater desire to
be well-informed on the message
topic, and considered the message topic
more important.

It is worth

noting that the arguments variable had
no impact on subjects' perceptions
of the communicator.

The findings of the present experiment suggest
that retention of

communication content may be a more important determinant
of lasting opinion
change than of the individual's immediate response
to persuasion.

In a

regression analysis (using data from all subjects) employing
initial

opinion change as the criterion variable, argument recall
contributed
only marginally to the prediction equation (£=.08) while
subjects' positive

message-oriented thoughts (£<.025), negative message oriented thoughts

(£=.06), positive communicator-oriented thoughts (£<.05), and perceptions
of communicator expertise (£^ .05) contributed somewhat

m.ore

strongly.

When delayed opinion change was the criterion variable, however, argument
recall was the strongest predictor of opinion change (£<.01), with negative message-oriented thoughts (£<.05), positive communicator-oriented
thcui^h
but:r.j^

C£<.05), and positive message-oriented thoughts
less strongly to the prediction equation.

(£-^.08)

contri-

Also, as noted earlier,

argur.ant recall appe::red to be a primary determinant of the fact that
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opinion change remained virtually stable
between posttests for high
consequences subjects but declined significantly
for low consequences
subjects

Effects of Sex and Topic
Subjects' sex had no significant impact
on opinion change, either

alone

or in combination with other experimental
variables.

Regarding

the topic variable, subjects who read
trimester, rather than sleep, mes-

sages recalled more arguments, considered the
message topic more important,

and generated more positive and neutral and fewer
negative message-

oriented thoughts.

Consistent with these findings, trimester messages

tended to elicit marginally greater opinion change
than sleep messages.
Further, the Topic X Consequences X Likeability X Arguments
interaction,

significant or marginally significant in the three analyses of opinion
change scores, indicated that the primary experimental variables exerted
a stronger impact on opinion change within trimester message conditions

than within sleep message conditions.

Of potential concern was the fact

that on initial opinion change, where the 4-way interaction was marginally

significant, the patterning of means obtained within trimester conditions
tended to resemble more closely the overall (across topics) patterning
than did the patterning obtained within sleep conditions.

However, the

one "apparent deviation" from the overall pattern observed within sleep

message conditions (see Figures IB and 3B and results section) represented
only a nonsignificant trend among means.

Thus, while the overall findings

obtained on initial opinion change were paralleled much more closely

within trimestfcr than within sleep message conditions, the generality of
the overall initial opinion change findings do not appear to be seriously
coniprcmised by the observed topic differences.
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Summary and C o nclusions
The results obtained on initial
opinion change, though statistically

weak on an overall basis, as well as
results obtained on other dependent
measures were generally compatible with
the hypothesis that high conse-

quences subjects would engage in a
relatively detailed information

processing strategy in which content-oriented
cognitions would mediate
initial opinion change, whereas low
consequences subjects would engage
in a comparatively low level information
processing strategy in which

source-based cognitions would primarily mediate
initial opinion change.
The present research thus supports the
importance of the distinction made

between the systematic view of persuasion, with
its emphasis on detailed
information processing and its focus on the role of
content-based cognitions in mediating opinion change, and the heuristic
view of persuasion,

with its emphasis on relatively low-level information
processing and its
focus on the role of simple rules or cognitive heuristics
in mediating
the impact of non-content cues on opinion change.

While the opinion change findings obtained within low consequences
conditions were consistent with the view that the persuasive impact of

communicator likeability might reflect the operation of

a

simple cognitive

schema suggesting that "people typically agree with persons they like",
the present experiment provided no direct evidence to favor this simple

information processing explanation over other explanations for attractiveness effects in persuasion.

Th-js,

the attractiveness effects obtained

in the present study are also consistent with -the idea that people agree

with like communicators in order to emulate or identify with these

cotumu-

nicators (Kelman, 1961), and also consistent with the idea chat people

agree with liked communicators in the
interest of maintaining cognitive

consistency (Heider, 1958)

.

Future research might well address itself

more closely to exploring the mediation
of attractiveness effects in

persuasion.
The findings of the present study were also
moderately consistent

with the hypothesis that content-mediated
opinion change would tend to
persist longer than would source-mediated opinion
change:

\^ile- opinion

change decreased significantly between the initial
and delayed opinion

posttest for low consequences subjects, it remained
virtually stable over
the 10 day period for subjects in high consequences
conditions.

Also of

importance to understanding persistence effects in persuasion
was the
suggestive correlational finding that retention of communication
content
was a better predictor of delayed opinion change than of initial
opinion
change, while recipients' cognitive reactions to the persuasive
message

predicted initial opinion change better than delayed opinion change.
Further research should attempt to provide more direct

evidence regarding

the relative importance of retention of communication content and recipients'

cognitive responses to the communication content as determinants of

immediate and lasting opinion change.
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TABLE

Opinion Change

2

as a Function of Time of Assessn,ent,
Perceived

Future Consequences, and Coinniunicator
Likeability.

Likeable

Time of
Assessmont

High
perceived
consequenc«is

Initial

2.42

Delayed

tiOTE:

2.67

C(2ll

coiranunicator

Low
perceived
consequences

Unlikeable
High
perceived
consequences

communicator
Low
perceived
conseqv'.'jnces

2.56

1,94

1.23

1.61

1.61

1.05

n's r£.nge from 40 to 50
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TABLE 5
Partial Correlations (controllinq
for aae) betw^on Initial . ^
Delayed Opinion Ch-.n.e and Other
Copendont VariaMo
o"iota?
Sar-ple and High and low
Consequonces Conditions r.pJrftcly!
Total Sar'ple (n=L83)
Initial
Delayed
opinion
opinion
chancre
changg

Hijh Consonuonc^gjn^fiO)^
Initial
'^'^^'-'e^
opinion
opinion
change
cl'.ange

L o^

ConsonuencMr,= 89)
Initial
Delayed
opinion
opinion
change
change

Source Rating

Trustworthy
Sincere
Unbiased
Attractiveness
Expertise

-.13 /
-.05
-.07

-.14/
-.

26**»»

-.07
-.12
-.02
-.12
-.22***

.-.10

-.11
-.03
-.17
-.25*

-.14
-.20
-.02
-.22*
-.25*

.14
.00

.10
.10

.29***

.02

-.03
-.02
.02

-.13

Coinprehnssicn and Thoucrhts

Argument recall
C+ thoughts
CCP

18*
06
05
02

"

M+
MMo
Total thoughts
^Mess.-ycon.X't-,>

32****
25*** *
CI
03
08

25****

,27****
-.09
-.12
-.09
29****
-.22***
-.06
-.15*
_

.11
25* ***

.

.26*

.30***

-.0,1

.08
.23*

-.10
-.08
.41****
-. 32***

,09
,

.05

.on

25*

18^

.15

34***

25*

.17/
-.16

.03

.05

.01

-.08
29**
-.22*
-.15
-.05

.

20^

-.16

-.11
.

26*

.06

-.10

-.03
.OT

.

.01
14

.01
.19

.07

.15

.

y

Other Dependent Me asures
spent
reading ir.ossage
.12
Self-reported
time thinking
about comnuricator
Tiitif?

(vs,

foasonsl

,18*

.03

Topic irmrtanco -.26****

.21**

.14

,16

.09

.24*
25*

-.05
-.13

-.05
-.15

-.25*
-.06
-.06

-.03
-.01

_

4 2* * * *

.

30***

.20/

.

13

.17
.09

Desir^i

to be
Vvell laiorrned
Int.'^r^iat

Effnrr.

^

P <-10
P < o
*"
p < .01
p < .005
*

*
» *

.

I

•» *•

**

p<

.

JOl

_,27****
-.10
-.08

.

27****

.11
.07

.09

.

_

,

33* **
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Fiqure 1

A.

Initial Opinion Change as a Function of
Coirmunicator Likeabilitv
and Perceived Future Consequences
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Figure

2

Opinion Change as a F;inction
of Time of Posttest
^^^^^est
and Perceived Future
Consequences
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High perceived consequences
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Figure

3
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C1.70)^-

y

(1.32)

l.Q-\

(.01)
0.>

—

r-

High
consequences

Low
consequences

Opinion
charge

(2.95)
(2.15)

2.0
1.0-»

(1.07);f

0.0
1

High
consequences

,

Low
const:quences
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I

Dependent Measures
Initial Opinion Measure

Initial s

OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE
Directions
The purpose of this questionnaire is
to get your preliminary
opinions on the topics which will be
discussed in disLsion groups
pILse
read
statement and decide how much you agree or
disagree with It.
appropriate number
^'^^'^"S
aw'the'^"l''''°"'\'?
along
the scale given below the item.
Lower numbers indicate stronger
agreement. Higher numbers indicate stronger
disagreement.
:

e^

1.

All students, faculty, and staff should be
required to take a yearly
medical e::amination at the University Health
Service.
/

•

^

^

•

3

Agree
strongly

2.

/

4

/

7

:

8

;

9

/

10

:

11

12

:

/

13

Neither
Disagree
agree nor
moderately
disagree

14

:

;

1

•

2

:

3

/

A

;

5

:

6

/

7

Agree
moderately

:

8

:

9

/

10

;

11

;

1

;

2

;

3

/

Agree
strongly

4

;

5

;

6

/

12

/

13

Neither
Disagree
agree nor moderately
disagree

Agree
moderately

7

;

8

;

9

/

Neither
agree nor
disagree

10

;

11

:

15

/

Disaoree
strongly

14

;

;

the-^r

15

/

Disagree
strongly

People should sleep much less than the typical average of
per night.
/

12

/

13

Disagree
moderately

3

;

hours

14

;

15

/

Disagree
strongly

The University should switch from its current two-semester system to
a trimester system.
/

1

:

2

:

3

/

Agree
strongly

5.

6

:

Agree
moderately

Agree
strongly

4.

5

Students should be required to write an undergraduate
thesis in
major field.
/

3.

:

4

:

5

;

6

/

Agree
moderately

7

:

8

:

9

/

Neither
agree nor
disagree

10

;

11

;

12

/

13

Disagree
moderately

:

14

;

15

/

Disagree
strongly

Coffee drinking should be considered as a recognised health hazard.
/

1

:

2

;

Agree
strongly

3 /

^

:

5

:

6

Agree
moderately

/

7

;

3

:

9

Neither
agree nor
disagree

/

10

:

11

:

12

Disagree
moderately

/

13

:

14

;

15

Disagree
strongly

/
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Other Measures
Initials___

REACTIONS TO OPINION

Transcript

I.

//

Tape #

INTERVIEW
Subject

//

Instructions: List below your thoughts and
ideas about what the
person who was interviewed said during
his/her interview. Write
down anything that occurs to ycu.
State your thoughts and ideas
concisely - a phrase is sufficient. You will
have THREE MINUTES to
write down your ideas. Please stop writing
immediately and go on to
the next page when told to do so.
Do not go on if vou fini^^h early.

Idea_
Idea_
Idea_

Idea_
Idea_
Idea_

Idea_
Idea_

Idea_
Id2a_

Idea_

Idea

STOP.

DO NOT GO ON TO NEXT PAGE UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO.

104

Warm vs. cold

^^T

sS^S^rtS^

S^J^ShST^'-^^T"^

Uncertain

cold

Knowledgeable vs. unknowledgeable
^

^

^

•

/

Very
knowledge^^^^

^

•

^

6

•

/

Somewhat
knowledge-

7

:

8

:

9

/

Uncertain

10

:

11

:

12

/

13

Somewhat
unknowledgeable

^^1^

:

1

^

:

15

/

unknLledgeable

Modest vs. arrogant
^

^

•

^

•

3

/

very
modest

4

:

5

6

:

/

7

Somewhat
modest

=

«

r

Q

/

Uncertain

t

o

:

11

.

12

/

1-^

Somewhat
arrogant

;

14

.

15

/

15

/

V^^^;^

arrogant

Intelligent vs. unintelligent
/

1

;

2

:

3

/

4

Very
intelligent

;

5

;

6

/

7

;

8

:

9

/

10

:

11

;

12

/

Somewhat
Uncertain
Somewhat
intelligent
unintelligent

13

;

14

:

unintelligent

Approachable vs. unapproachable
/

^

••

2

•

3

/

Very
approach"
able

4

:

5

:

6

/

Somewhat
approachable

7

:

8

;

9

/

Uncertain

10

:

11

;

12

/

Somewhat
unapproachable

13

:

14

:

15

/

Vary
unapproachable

Competent vs. incompetent

/I

:

2

:

3

/

Very
competent

4

;

5

;

6

/

7

Somewhat
competent

:

8

;

9

/

Uncertain

10

:

11

:

12

/

Ij

Somewhat
incompetent

;

14

;

15

/

Very
incompetent

Likeable vs. unll.keable
/

1

:

2

:

Very
likeable

3

/

4

;

5

:

6

Somewhat
likeable

/

7

;

8

:

9

Uncertain

/

10

:

11

;

Somewhat
unlikeable

12

/

13

;

14

:

15

Very
unlikeable

/
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8.

Trustworthy vs. untrustworthy

\/

^

•

3

/

7/F^^~
trustworthy
9.

;

/

7

;

8

:

9

U^^^^ln

trustworthy

^

•

•

^

^
Very
pleasing

^

^

=

5

•

^

/

Somewhat
pleasing&

1

;

2

;

3

/

Very
sincere

/

10

;

11

:

1

7

/

Somewhat
untrustworthy

13

•

n

•
'

15

/

v;ry
untrustworthy

7

:

8

:

9

/

Uncertain

10

:

11

;

1?

/

13

Somewhat
annovino
annoying

:

14

•

15

/

•

annoying

4

:

5

;

6

/

Somewhat
sincere

7

;

8

:

9

/

Uncertain

10

;

11

:

1?

/

13

S^;;S;it
insincere

.

1^

/

.

V^^^;^

insincere

Friendly vs. unfriendly
^

^

\^

•

3

/

Very
friendly
12.

S

Sincere vs. insincere
./

11.

:

^^^^t

Pleasing vs. annoying
^

10.

A

A

:

5

:

6

/

7

Somewhat
friendly

:

8

:

Q

/

Uncertain

in

.

11

:

12

/

Somewhat
unfriendly

13

:

1^

,

/

Ver^
unfriendly

Unbiased vs. biased
/

^

•

^

•

3

Ve r y
unbiased

/

4 : 5 :
S omewhat

unbiased

6

/

7

:

8

:

9

Uncertain

/

10

;

11

:

Somewhat
biased

12

/

13

;

14

Very
biased

;

15

/
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III.

2.

Write down as exactly as von r.n.
the overall position expressed by
bv
the person being intervewed on
his/her topic:

3.

Write down a brief summary of each of
the reasons which you can
recall that the person being interviewed
used to support his/her
overall position on his/her topic:

107
IV.
1.

How important do you think the
topic is which was discussed
in the
interview transcript that you read?
1

/

:

2

3

:

/

A

^5_

6

.:

7

/

Soniewhat

,

important

8

:

9

:

10

/

n

.

u

:

S^hlE

N^Ehl^

13

/

14

:

.15

/

verv
unimportant

important important unimportant
nor unimportant

To what extent would you like to
be well informed on the topic
wh^ch
was discussed
the interview transcript that you
read?

m

f-^^
To a very
•

3

/

great extent
3.

5

:

6

:

7

/

R

;

9

;

^

'

extent

A

'2-

'

Very
interested

extent

!

5

:

6

;

7

/

Somewhat
interested

8

:

9

:

/

Uncertain

1

;

2

;

3

/

4

;

5

:

6

/

7

:

8

;

9

/

A great deal A moderate Uncertain
of effort
amount of effort

12

:

/

14
15
a very
.

T^

:

/

little extent

10

:

11

;

12

13

/

Somewhat
uninterested

:

14

:

15

/

V^^^
uninterested

10

;

11

;

12

13

/

A little
effort

;

14

;

IW

A very little
effort

While reading the interview transcipt, did you tend to
spend more
time thinking about the person being interviewed and
his/her characteristics or more time thinking about the reasons given for
the
person's overall position on his/her topic?
/

1

;

2

;

3

Much more
time thinking about
the person

6.

11

;

To a little
extent

How much effort did you put into reading the
interview transcript?
/

5.

10

/

To a moderate

How interested were you in attempting
to understand the reasons giver
by the person interviewed in support of
his/her overall position on
iiis/ner topic?
f

4.

A

To a large

/

4

;

5

;

6

Somewhat
more time
thinking
about the
person

/

7

:

8

:

9

Uncertain

/

10

;

11

:

12

/

13

:

14

:

15

/

Somewhat
Much more time
more time
thinking about
thinking about
the reasons
the reasons

Any other comments about the transcript that you

re^.d?

Phcne Instrument Used to Assess
Delayed Opinions
PHONE FOLLOWUP
I^^'^^^"^^).
I am calling for Project
CONTACl. a student survey project
CONTAC?^^^.?;?^'^'''
being conducted by a survey research
group in the psychology department.
This semester, we've beL pouIne
students about how they feel about
various aspects

of uSss Ufe!
^o-'
°^ students' feelings about various aspec s
of
ttt
structure here at UMass and, in addition,
on s'.udlnts'
feelinir^'J
feelings
and opinions about physical and
psychological ^ell-being?

LT

JIT T

"^^"^ '"^""'"^
^^^^ °^ tonight's sample
Your
name iTll Zl
responses are confidential,
Sould
would >ou
iou li
mind answering a few questions for us?

^*

questions concern your feelings about various
aspects
n5%^°\^T°T^''^
ot the University structure here
at Ullass.

1.

How do you feel about the size of the
average undergraduate class
at UMass?
1.
Definitely too large
2.
Just about the right size
3.
Definitely too small

2.

In general, how would you rate the overall
quality of teaching at
UMass?
1.
High quality
2.
Average quality
Low quality
3.

Please rate your agreem.ent with the following three questions (explain
agreemeiat scale)
3.

There should be a much closer administrative relationship between the
Amherst and Boston campuses of UMass.
1.
Definitely agree
2.
Somewhat agree
3.
Neutral
4.
Somewhat disagree
5.
Definitely disagree

4.

The University sould expand the size of its professional schools
(e.g. medical, law).
(same scale as above)

5.

The University should change over to a trimester system.
(same scale as above

—

code S's response.)
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TT

oLir^? and psychological
^"^f
physical
well-being.

feelings and opinions about

6.

semester have you gone to the health
center for medical
attention?
1.
5 or more times
3-4 times
2.
1-2 times
3.
4.
Haven't been

7.

How satisfied are you with the Mental Health
services on campus 7
1.
Definitely satisfied
2.
Satisfied
3.
Dissatisfied
4.
Definitely dissatisfied
5.
Don't know

Please rate your agreement with the following
agreement scale)
8.

questions (again, explain

3

Artificial sweeteners such as saccharin should be banned as the
Food
and Drug Administration has suggested.
1.
Definitely agree
2
Somex>7hat agree
3.
Neutral
4.
Somewhat disagree
5.
Definitely disagree
.

9.

People should not be allowed to smoke in lecture courses at UMass.
(same agreement scale as above)

10.

People should sleep less than the usual
(same scale

8

hours a night,

code S's response)

III.
1.

Have you been in any similar surveys this past semster?
suspicion)

2.

Thank you for participating in this survey.

(code for

APPENDIX II

110

Interview Transcripts
Page 1, Version

1

(Likeable communicator, Sleep
topic)
Interviewer:
of segments of the camous community
view certain r^niH

li:r:oit'\Ti

Z

/

"""^

"""^^er
!

J t

^ichr:;;;°x?rii::^ri'n e^^ew
'"^''^ "^'^^^S of your

opinion on the tonic
^'^^ interview, you'll b m :
g
^"^^
across the hall.
^^^^
Before
ve get
eet on with
wf th'^H
the interview, though, why don't
you give me a little

IZ't.

vUh yourassi^LTH-'""

background information about yourself?

Mr. MSKS^S^i

Let's see.— I've worked at the Student
Affairs office for the past
eight years. My job concerns various
non-academic asoects of University
life and one of my cr>ajor responsibilities
is to work with undergraduates
who represent various student organizations on
canous
.We 11
I don't
know what else to add-i'm married and I've
got two children.. I'm 35. ..
don
t
really have any hobbies to speak of but
1
I do read a fair ar.ount
.

Interviewer:

Mr,

i^T^fihfff

OK.

Well

.

,

By the way, how do you like working with
undergraduates?
as a matter of fact, I really enjoy it
a lot.

When I first started
was a little apprehensive about the idea
Of working so much with undergraduates. Over the years,
however, I've
realized that my apprehension was unjustified. The
undergraduates who
I ve met both in my work with various student organizations and
in other
•ettlngs as well strike me as being pretty responsible and mature.
They're
really concerned, I think, with their role in society,
i don't know of
course but sometimes I think that the public too often underestimates
the ability and maturity of today's college student.
They just don't give
undergraduates enough credit. Anyway, it's no wonder that I continve to
do the work that I do... For me, working with undergraduates has been
pretty rewarding.

my job here at the University

I

Interviewer

Oh
that's interesting. .. .Now, as you were told earlier, the main purpose
of this interview is to get a more in depth reading of your opinion on
the topic which you've been assigned. Let's see
your topic was whether
or not people should sleep less than the typical average of 8 hours per
olght.
l-iTiat I'd like you to do now is to state your opinion on this
topic and then to go on and tell me some or your reasons for holding
that opinion. Are there any questions?

Mr. 4S/9^HSi:

No, I'q clear on what to do.

Interviewer:

OK then, why don't you just start.
the recording equipment.

Please try to speak clearly into
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.

Page

1,

Version

2

(Unlikeable communicator, Sleep
topic)
Interviewer:

Jn'klf;t^^',rin'::.::L%Tn::

-Pen^ental session,

discuss their views with one
aaothe'r. "ght
t?.
you in order to ^et a nore in ri»^t-w
^
^^""^ ^° interview
*
j
"'''"^^^ °" ^'^^
you've been assigned to discuss ^
°
Af ^r th'
-ctlng with your assign d i
:sstonro'p\i\'h"'''"' ^'^'^^^
Before we get on with th^ fnrll
^he hall,
f
''''''''
^ivo .e a
little backgroL'bout

I

yoirs'nr^*

Mr.

eleht ye"::"Vir;r^'
life an'r;
; of

"

''"'^"^ ^^^'^^^

r"e":o::ibirit"°'''"'^^'^

Interviewer:
Mr. ^SZSJi»:

OK.

past
°^

^-'^-"^^^

By the way. how do you like working
with undergraduates?

"'^^y
'
When I
nll't startr^"'^-°K
university I was a little apprehensive
about th!
the idea of working so much with
undergraduates. Over the yearl
'
apprehension has been W tif ^d
'
ihl undT
/'I'
J''"^
organlzat ons and
other settings as well strike me as
being oretty
irresponsible and i::^atare too. They're
really unconcerned. I think'
'
I ^-'^ know of course out so.^ti.es
I
ttlJtltl
^K
'l'°'''''y'
think that the public too often overes
t inmates the ability ana
maturity
Of today s college student. They give
undergraduates nore credit than
they deserve. Any.7ay, sometimes I wonder
why I continue to do the work
I do... For me, working with undergraduates
really hasn't been very^
rewarding.
^

m

—

Interviewer;

Oh
Chat's interesting.... Now, as you were told
earlier, the main
purpose of this interview is to get a more in depth
reading of vour
opinion on the topic which you've been assigned.
Let's see
your
topic was whether or not people should sleeo less
than the typical
average of 8 hours per night. -—'.;hat I'd like you to
do now is to
•tote your opinion on this topic and then to go on and tell
me some
of your reasons for holding that opinion. Are there any
questions?

Mr. M.3:*sst:

No, I'm clear on what to do.

Interviewer:

OK

t!\en, why don't you just st?rt.
the recording equipment.

*

Please try to speak clearly into

Page

1,

Version
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3

(Likeable commimicator Trimester
,
topic)
Interviewer

""^

In^thif ;t'^7^^'

^^"t experimental scssloa

or segments of the canpus conununity
view certain topics and how thev
discuss the.r vic-.s with one another.
,1i,ht now.
like to Interview
'^^'^^
°^ your opinion ^n Jh^^ ^ic
vo^i:
you
ve be
been assigned to discuss. After this
interview. vou'U be reetine
vith your assigned discussion group in the
roo:. across'the ha 1
B fore'
i^^-rview. though, why don't you give me a
1 ttle
;
background information
about yourself?

hLf

Mr.

Let s see -I've worked at the Student
Affairs office for the past
eight years. My job concerns various non-acadamtras^ec
ts orUniCersity
life and one of my major responsibilities is
to work with undergraduates
Who represent various student organizations on camous
.Well
I don't
know what else to add--l'm married and I've got two
children! .I'm 35
I don t really have any hobbies to speak of but
I do read a fair amount".
'

.

Interviewer;
Mr.

£t^f^.t,ii

;

OK.

By the way,

Uell. as

a

hen;

.

do you like working with undergraduates?

matter of fact,

I

really enjoy it

a

lot.

When

I

first r-tarted

my job here at the University I was a little apprehensive about
the idea
of working so much with undergraduates. Over the years, however.
I've
realized that ay apprehension was unjustified. The undergraduates
who
I ve met both in my work with various student organizations and
in other

settings as well strike me as being pretty responsible and nature.
They're
really concerned, I think, with their role in society.
I don't know of
course but sometimes I think that the public too often underestimates
the ability and maturity of today's college student.
They just don't give
undergraduates enough credit. An^-way, it's no wonder chat I continue to
do the work that I do... For me, working with undergraduates ha; 03 en
pretty rewarding.

Interviex^er

Oh
that's interesting. .. .Now, as you were told earlier, the main purpose
of this interview is to get a more in depth reading of your opinion on
the topic which you've been sssi<:ned.
Let's see
your topic v/as
vhether or not the University should switch from its current two-semester
system to a trimester system.
What I'd like you to do now is to state
your opinion on this topic and then to go on and tell rre some of your
reasons for holding that opinion. Are there any questions?

Mr.

No, I'm clear on what to do.

Interviewer;

OK then, why don't you just start,
the recording equipment.

Please try to speak clearly into
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Page 1, Version

A

(Unllkeable coimnunlcator. Trimester
topic)
Interviewer;
experimental session.
Of segment, of the
ca.pu:":::unuA:er:: ^ain t"'""".' t
their views witt. one another.
^^^^ '^^"'^^
Ri^^t ^ow ?'d J^v
f
order to get a more in depth
^"^^^^i^'-' y°u in
reading of ^^^^^Pi^i^"
on the topic you've
been assigned to discuss
After hf. f
your assigned discus
""'^"^ with
ion*.riup"n Jie ^00"'""'
"^'^.^"oss '""t
the hall.
get on with the interviL th! u
Before we
t
' '
background about'ourlelf ?
^ ^^"1^

''i^-''^^ifs^^1^

^ ^

^

Mr.

^Ssf*

^^e past
'"^ ""'^^^
eight ;::;;'"'Mr "rl"'
"^^^^^^
^''-er.ity
life ard
of
rresL:"H°r."°""'"'^'^'^
vho represent
know what else to add-I'. married
and I've got two ch
r:n' vl z^
I don t really have any hobbies
to speak of but I do read a
f;Jr am;;;:;*

JL
^arL^^-r:-^^

Interviewer:
Mr. pjsr^^sa;

Interviewer;

OK.

"^''^^ ^"^^^^
^^^en I
^irst startrrmr-°s' k'''' ' 'r''
University I was a little apprehensive
about the
tie ?d^.
idea of working so much with
undergraduates. Over the years
I m sorry to say, I think that my
apprehension has been justified
The
undergraduates who I've -met both in my work
with various stuSt
organizations and in other settings as well
strike me as being pretty
Irresponsible and irx^.ature too. They're really
unconcerned, 1 Link.
society.
I don-t know of course but sometimes
I
^^^^
""u^'
think that the public too often overestimates
the ability and maturity
of today s college student.
They give undergraduates more credit than
they deserve. An%vay, sometimes I wonder why
I continue to do the work
I do... For me, working with undergraduates
really hasn't been very
'
rewarding.

Oh-— that's interesting

Now, as you were told earlier, the main
purpose of this interview is to get a more in depth
reading of your
opinion on the topic which you've been assigned. Let's
see
Your
topic was whether or not the University should switch
from its current
two-semester system to a trimester sys ten. --What I'd like
yiu to do now
is to state your opinion on this topic and then
to go on and tell me some
of your reasons for holding that opinion. Are there any
questions?
No,

Interviewer:

By the way. ho./ do you like working
with undergraduates?

I'm clear on what to do.

OK then, why don't you just start,
the recording equipment.

Please try to speak clearly into

Page
(Sleep message:
Mr.

4PSD!$3fi^:

2,

Version

Two arguments version, rendition
1)

Interviewer;

feel'the'waV';::
Mr.

1

^°

^^"^

^or why you

"^'^

OK.. .Well, since I knew you'd be asking
me about how I felt on this
topic I've tried to think pretty
carefully about whv I feel'his
'"""^^
^^^^^"^^ ^°
^^^^ead

-

Of ;:'Iett?n°";
^'^^ ^ ^^^"^
interesting
' "
•ad one
^fd
onf that
hatSI thinkrr^'"'
I know something about...— One
reason why I feel
^^"^ °"
'^^'^^ P^°P^^ "'^ be trained to
S!/.^
o^ximize \t°-'''
their REM, you know rapid eye movement
sleep, which is really
the most important phase of sleep that
people need.
This can be done.
If I remember correctly, through a program
where you take a couple of
naps per day
Interviewer
Mr.

...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?

Well, yes. ..I was just thinking a minute ., .Well
a somewhat different
reason for my opinion cores from some sleep research
that's boen pretty
widely reported-i'm not sure where I heard about it.
Anyway, it seems
that this physiological sleep research has shown
that long periods of
sleep are associated with increased rates of heart disease
and, I think
also, other kinds of physical ailments
--I guess those are my major
reasons, I can't really think of anything else right now..
,

Interviewer;

OK, that was fine.
I'd like to thank you for participating thus far
In our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the
hall. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over
there. The others should also be finished with their interviews by
now and are probably drifting in.
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Mr. ^SSSSima:

Well, of course 1 realize that oeople My differ
sllghtlv on an
Individual basis, but overall. I'd have Co say that
In my opinion
people should sleep much less than the typical average
of 8 hours
per night.

Interviewer;

Fine.
1*11 just let you go ahead now with your reasons for why
you
feel the way you do.

Mr.

JC^amm:

OK.... Well, since I knew you'd be asking me about how I felt on this
topic, I've tried to think pretty carefully about why I feel this
way... You know, even though the sleep topic was assigned to me instead
of me getting to choose it. it's a topic that I think is interesting
and one that I think I know something about...
One reason for my
opinion Is based on the fact that the amount of sleep that people
get per night varies between different cultures--I remember reading
about that years ago. What I guess I'm saying, then, is that the
•mount of time that people spend sleeping is really kind of arbitrary.
It's like a habit and it's not as If we really need a certain amount..,

Interviewer:
Mr.

...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?

£C^S»i

.

Interviewer;

Well, yes. ..I was just thinking a minute. . .Well , a somewhat different
reason comes from this research finding I heard about--! don't
remember where--that most people who have shifted from sleeping 8 cr
more hours per night to less than 8 hours per night tend to report
that they feel better physically and are more alert mentally..
I guess those are ray cajor reasons, I can't really think of anything
else right now..
;
I'd like to thank you for participating thus far
OK, that was fine.
In our study.
Your discussion group Is meeting in the room across
the hall. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go
over there. The others should also be finished with their interviews
by now and are probably drifting In.
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Hr.

Mr. 4l»eS3»9P;

OK.... Well, since I knew you'd be askini;; me
about how I felt on this
topic. I ve trred to think pretty carefully
about vhy I feel this
"^"'^ ''^P^^ ^-^^ "^isned to me instead
n?^::•''°^^^°'':
'^^"^ I "^^^i"!^ i5 Interesting
^
' "
IL
.1 .\I V.^?"""^
and I
one that
think I know something about...— one reason
whv I reel
is based on the fact that people can
be trained to maximize
luli^'^Ll
tneir RLM, you know rapid eye movement sleeo,
which is really the most
Important phase of sleep that people need. This
can be done, if I
remember correctly, throu-h a program where you
take a couple of naps
per day.... You know, another reason why
I feel the wav I do is based
on this survey I remember reading about once in one
of the weekly news
magazines. I remember that the survey found that lots
of successful
people. Including artists, writers, scientists, even athletes,
tend to
8*eep a lot less than S hours a nicht
Another study that I remember
hearing about brings up a related point. The study, which was
the
report of an experiment, I think, divided people into those who slept
an average of 8 hours a night and those who slept an average of 6 or
»o hours per night.
Then they had these people perform in the experiment
on lots of tasks that are supposed to measure hew well you perform on
Intellectual-type problems. The thing that they found which stuck in
my tnlnd was that the people who slept 6 hours a night did much better
on the tests than the people who slept 8 hours

Interviewer:

..Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?

Mr. |£«253^:

Interviewer:

Well, yes. ..I was just thinking a minute. . .Veil I do rememoer hearing
aonewnere, I can't remember where, that most people who have shifted from
sleeping 3 or more hours a night to less than 8 hours tend to report
that they feel better physically and are more alert mentally....! guess
a related point coir.es from some sleeo research that's been pretty widely
reported.
It seems th^t this physiological sleep research has shewn that '^'''^
long periods of sleep ar« associated with increased rates of heart
disease and, I t'.iink also, other kinds of physical ailments
Let's
see. Well, oh yes.
One other and I guess somewnat different reason for
vhy I feel this v/ay is based on the fact th:it the amount of sleep that
people get per night varies between different cultures--! rencaber reading
about that years ago. Wh:3C I guess I'm saying, then, is that the amount
of time that people spend sleeping is really kind of arbitrary, it's like
a habit and its not as if we really need a certain amount
I guess those
cajor reasons, I can't really think of anything else right now..
are
,

OK, that was fine.
I'd like to thank ycu for participating
Study.
Your discussion group is meeting in the room across
don't you take a sliorc break if you'd like and then jro over
Others should jIso be finished with thcl;' Interviews by now

thus far In our
Why
the hall.
The
there.
and are

probably uriftins in.

\

'

Page 2, Version 4
(Sleep message:
Mr.

Six arguments version, rendition
2)

peopU^sHouU Sleep .ucH less'cHa^

^U^^

interviewer:

Mr.

cHe

let ,ou ,o a.ea. no. witH .our

OK.. ..Well, since I knew you'd be asking

Z

.tL^e"

n,o

.easo. for

about how

^^^^

I'lZl

I

^^^S-^

,ou

felt cn this

-

instead
interesting
one
I know something about...— One reason
whv I
feel the way I do is based on this survey
that I remember reading about
once in one of the weekly news magaziaes,
I don't remember which'one.
Anyway, I remember that the survey found that
lots of successful
people, including artists, writers, scientists,
even athletes, tend to
sleep a lot less than 8 hours a night.
...i would sav that another
reason for ray opinion comes from the fact that
pcoole can be trained
to maximize their REM. you know, rapid eye
movement sleep, which is
really the most important phase of sleep that people
need.
Ihis can
be done, if I remember correctly, through a
program where you take a
couple of naps per day
I think that a different kind of reason
comes from some sleep research findings that have been
pretty widely
reported.
It seems that this physiological sleep research has shown
that long periods of sleep are associated with increased
rates of
heart disease and, I think also, other kinds of physical
ailments

Of

!L
• nd

Interviewer:
Mr. ffi^^te*:

,

Interviewer:

;;'Iettir;
that^^I

''t

u
l'"^
think

^

^^^"^

I "^^i^k is

..Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?

Well, yes...I was just thinking a minute. . .Well , I do remember hearing
somewhere, I can't remember where, that most people who have shifted
from sleeping S or more hours a night to less than 8 hours, tend to
report that they feel better physically and are more alert mentally..
I guess that another and also pretty different reason for why I feel
this way comes from the fact that the amount of slee;> Chat people eet
per night varies between different cultures--! remember reading about
that years ago. What I guess I'm saying then, is that the amount of
time that people spend sleeping is really kind of arbitrary, it's like
a habit and it's not as if we really need a certain amount
Let's
•ee..Well, oh yes. One other reason comes from this other srudy I
remember hearing about. The study, which was the report of an
experiment, I think, divided people into those who slept an average of
6 hours a night and those who slept an average of 6 or so hours per
night.
Then they had these people perform in the experiment on lots
of task? that are supposed to measure how well you perform cn intellectualtype problems. The thing they found that stuck in my mind was that
the people who slept 6 hours a night did much better on the tests Chan
the pwopi.j who slept 8 hours
I guess chose are my major reasons,
I can't really think of anything else right now.
OK, that was fine.
I'd like to thank you for partlc Ipatlnp thus far in
our study. Your discussion group Is meeting in the room across the
h^ll. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and Chen go over
Tha ochcrs should also be finished with their Interviews by now
there.
ead sre probably drifting in.

•
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jthL' ;r";%jir.r"=
interviewer:

^^-^n^^^

Ut

e.ee. „„,

,„

OK.

Well, since I knew you'd be
a^^ns me about how I felt on tbi.
'°
^""^ "-^^^ly cbout why I feel U> J
^11 \l I
'^""^^
trinester topic was assigned to
'
Tnli::T%
Instead of mc petting
to choose it. it's a topic
that I crtnk is
Interesting and one that I think
I know so.ethin. abouJ
^--oie
^^"^
economic a
' '°
'xhe
Jni^e^'J^' I

L

-

S uS

a

^'ril^ter'

'^""''^

^'^"^

^-duatc students
"'-^^'^

'

-^^^^

tiev'd
they
d be used all year round by
more people

Interviewer:

Mr.«^:

in the

suler.

economical since

...Are there any other reasons you'd
like to add?

well

yes

I

was just thlnkins

minute
.Well . a different reason is
individualized.
Students who wanted
/l'"'"^*'^'^''^"'
to attend
two of the three sessions would graduate
in 4 vears like they
do now.
But those who wanted could go to all
the sessions and graduate
years,
something you can't really do easily with the
3
current
semester systen and the small summer school
program we have no.....
"I guess those are my major reasons, I can't really think of anything
-re,
else right now. .
a

m

.

Interviewer:

OK, that was fine.
I'd like to thank you for participating thus fa.
In our study.
Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the
hall. Why don t you take a short break if you'd
like and then -o over
there.
The others should also be finished with their interviews
by now
and are probably drifting in.

*
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Mr. ^(^ss^ass

Intervier-^er:

Mr.

^

2)

'^"^

'^^ consider, but
'^•^"^
University should switch
T^'°
current
f.:o-semester system to a trimester system.

T'Tl"

?ro;M:
from its

6

Fine.
I'll just let you go ahead now with your
reasons for why you
reel the way you do.

OK... Well, since I knew you'd be asking me about
how I felt on this
topic, I ve tried to think pretty carefully cbout
vhv I feel th-s
way... You know, oven though the trimester topic was
assigned to me
Instead of me getting to choose it, it's a topic that
I think is
interesting and one that I think I know somethinc about.
-One
reason why I feci the way I do is that with a trimester
system,
there would be less people on campus at cny one time
during the
year.
Therefore it would be less crowded on ccmpus than it is
.now and I think that during any one of the sessions
of the trimester,
it would make for a more intimate campus atmosphere
,

Interviewer:

...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?

Mr,4j!E^3g5:

Well, yes. ..I was just thinking a minute .. .Uell a different reason
is that at some other Universities like Michigan where they have a
trimester system, almost everybody, both faculty and students, really
likes it. According to this friend I have at Michigan, one main
reason is that people prefer having more- frequent breaks from school
rather than having one long summer break and a betiveen semester break...
--I guess those arc my major reasons, I can't really think of anything
else right now. ...

Interviewer:

OK, that was fine,
I'd like to thank you for participating thus far in
our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the
hall. Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over
there.
The others should also be finished with their incer-ziews by nwj

and are probably drifting in.

120

Page

•

2,

"'''^''^
«.
nf.A^Qk^:

Veil, of course

»n,.^^:.„

I

Version

7

''^ arguTnents version, rendition

rpaHT^o tu^^

,,,,,

_

1)

^^^^

Cr?:^j\r„:rr^^rij jL'fjrv-"'-^

^^.^^

-------

it would be less crowded
on campus than it in now and
I think that

more intimate campus atmosphere
i would say that another reason
for ny op nion is that I think that
the trimester system smor'
ind v.dualized.
students who wanted to attend two
of the hrersess-uns
'-"%^^^^/^^ey do now. But those who Cl^ter: ^ d
thrsL^t
'^^'^
and graduate in 3 years, something
vou can't
really do easily with the current
semester system and the small sumnor
school program we have now
i guess that a related point is that
th

r
ILMJI

"""^ '""'"'^

''''^

the summer
==
Till
like It
they Ado now
But, for whatever reason, some might
prefer to be
off duang a different season, like tho
Winter for instance, and with
the trimester system this would be
possible..

Interviewer:

Hr.4t^tffm:

...Are there any other reasons you'd like
to add?

Well, yes...: was just thinking a minute. ..
--Well a somewhat different
reason is based on econom.ic factors. The University
buildings are
kept open all year round as it is now since
they're used bv faculty
and graduate students in the summer. With a
trimester svstem, it would h
much more economical since they'd be used all year
round' by more
people...-— You know, another thing is that at some other
Universities
like Michigan where they have a trimester svstem.
almost everybody, both
faculty and students, really likes it. According uo this
friend I have
at Michigan, one main reason is that people prefer
navinji m.ore frequent
breaks from school rather than havinj one long summer break
and a
between semester break
Let's see.. -Well, oh yes. One other, and
I think very Important reason is that a trimester system would be much
better for those students who need to or want to work when school is not
in session.
The way it is now, with everybody looking for work during
the summer, competition for jobs is really terrible.
Oti a trimester
system with students off from school at different times during the year,
It would ba much easier for students to find the jobs that they need...
I guess those are my major reasons, I can't really think of anything
else right now.
,

Inteirvlewer:

CK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for participating thus far in
our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the hall.
Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over there.
The othtirs should also be finished with their interviews by no;- and are
probably drifting in.
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well of course I rcnll.e that there are
.aay fnctors to consider, hut
overall l d have to say that in my opinion
the University should
switch from its current tv;o-semester
system to a trimester system.

Interviewer:

Fine.
I'll just let you go ahead now with your
reasons for why you
/ / «
reel the way you do.

Mr./jCJ55a3lp:

OK
Well, since I knew you'd be asking me about
how I felt on this
topic, I ve tried to think pretty carefully about
why I feel this wny
You know, even thout^h the trimester topic was
assigned to mc instead
of me getting to choose it, it's a topic that
I think is interestinp
and one that I think I know something about.
---One reason why I feel
the way I do is that the trimester system gives
both faculty and
students more freedom. What I mean is that those who
wanted could take
off from school in the summer like they do now.
But, for whatever
reason, some might prefer to be off during a different season,
like the
Winter for instance and with the trimester system this would be
possible
1 would say that another and very important reason is that
a trimester system wonld be much better
for those students who need to
or want to work when school is not in session. The way it
is now, with
everybody looking for work during the summer, competition for jobs is
really terrible. On a trimester system with students being off from school
at different times during the year, it would be much easier
for student-;
to find the jobs that they need
.You know, another thing is that at
some Universities like Michigan where they have a trimester system, almost
everybody, both faculty and students, really likes it. According to this
friend I have at Michigan, one main reason is that people prefer having
more frequent breaks from school rather- than having one long summer
break and a between semester break

Interviewer:

...Are there any other reasons you'd like to add?

Hr.

f^fyt^:

Interviewer:

Well, yes. ..I was just thinking a minute ... .f,;o 11 a somewhat different
reason is based on economic factors. The University buildings are
kept open all year round as it Is now since they're used by faculty and
graduate students in the sumner. With a trimester system, it would be
much more economical since they'd be used all year round by more people...
...I" guess that another reason for my opinion is that I think that tho
trimester system is mor.? individualized.
St>5dents who wanted to attcna
two of the three sessions would graduate in 4 years like they do now.
But those who wanted could go to all the sessions and graduate in 3
years, something you can't really do easily with the current semester
system and the small summer school program we- have now
Let's see...
Well, oh yes. One other point that I think is inportsmt is that with a
trimester system, there would be less people on campus at any one time
during the year. Therefore it would be less crowded on campus than it
is now and I think that during any one of the sessions of the trimester
It would make for c more intimate campus atmosphere
I guess those
are my major reasons, I can't think of anything else right now.
,

OK, that was fine. I'd like to thank you for participating thus far in
our study. Your discussion group is meeting in the room across the hall.
Why don't you take a short break if you'd like and then go over there.
The others should also be finished with their Interviews by now and arc
probably drifting in.
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APPENDIX III

Opinion Change Marginal Means for
Higher Order
Interactions Involving the Sex and/or
Topic Variable
A.

^ function of Time of Assessment.
Perceived
Consequences, Arguments, and Message
Topic

Time of
Assessment

Initial

Delayed

Sleep m essage
High
Low
Consequences
Cons equences
six
two
six
two
arguarguarguarguments
ments
ments
ments
2.15

1.97

1.70

1.82

.94

4.25

1.04

2.94

2.14

1.22

1.43

.72

3.59

2.10

2.79

.50

—

B.

Trimester Message
High
Low
Consequences
Cnncpniionr^Qo
six
two
six
two
argu- arguarguarguments ments
ments
ments

Opinion change as a function of Time of Assessment,
Communicator
Lltceability, Arguments, and Message Topic
Sleep message

Time of
Assessment

Initial

Lik eable
Comm unicator
six
two
arguarguments
ments
2.12

1.87

Trimester Message

Unlik eable
Commu nicator
six
two
arguarguments
ments
1.78

.58

Likeable
Communicator
six
two
arguarguments
ments
4.09

2.08

Unlike able
Commun lea tor
six
two
argu- arguments ments
2.99

.98
j

Delayed

1.53

1.52

1.86

.25

4.31

1.48

1.92
-

Opinion change as a
.Message topic

function of Time of Assessment,

Sleep message

Time of
Assessment

Sex,

1.21
_

Trimester message

Females

Males

i

and

——
Males

1

|

Females
|

Initial

1.53

1.71

2.16

2.83

I

1

Delayed

1.16

1.43

2.47

1.98
j

1

'
1

,
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Footnotes

This study also employed a moderate
1.
credibility condition in which
no information was provided
regarding the source's LentitJ
T^e opinions
-iJway betweel th^^ Expres'^'^
sed by subjects
r'^'^'"
exposed to the high credibility and low
credibility
uxu^xxty
communicator, respectively.

s^\T; h^

While topics on which the individual
2.
perceives that holding an
opinion nas consequences for him(her)self
or for others may often be
topics of high importance or personal
relevance, this need not necessarily
be the case,
ror example, a juror may expend considerable
effort in carefully screening the evidence presented
for and against a particular
position on an issue (e.g., a civil law suit)
because of the consequences
of his/her expressed opinion for
other persons, even though for the
^iuror h
herself, the issue has little personal relevance.
^*
^ repeated measures analysis of opinion change, the nested massage
rendition variable interacted with the consequences
variable (p .05) and
the coirjTiunicator likeability variable
(£=.05).
These interactions
indicate that the impact of both the consequences
and the likeability
manipulation on opinions fluctuated somewhat depending
upon which rendition of the persuasive message was received.
Tlie following effects were significant
4.
jj>s
.05 or smaller) in an
analysis of variance on subjects' age: Likeabilitv main
effect;
Sex X
Consequences, Sex X Likeability, Sex X Topic, Arguments X Topic,
Sex X
Likeability X Arguments
and Likeability X Arguments X Topic interactions.

Subjects' initial opinions were assessed by having them mark 155.
point agreement scales while their delayed opinions were solicited over
the phone by having them respond orally to a 5-point agreement scale.
For
purposes of data analysis, subjects' delayed agreement scores were transformed to 15-point scales (see Minium, 1970, p. 115).
^

These and other means appearing in the text, tables, and figures,
6.
have been adjusted for subjects' age.
The results obtained with the two difference score indices (sum of
7.
message-oriented minus communicator-oriented index and sum. of positive
minus sum of negative thoughts index) did not differ in any substantial
way from the results obtained when the components of these difference
scores were analyzed separately.

Virtually identical factors were obtained when the data from male
8.
and female subjects were considered separately.
four regression problems, the sum of positive minus sum of
negative ..oughts index did not enter the prediction equation due to an
insufficient tolerance level for inclusion.
9.

In

a

i

131

thought, on'the co..uL
r!\;:y'jLSi: bel '^V't'^
sage and thus unpersuaded
by it
If such thou^h^r
^""^ ^ dlstracting function. It Is still
not clear «hv Tu rt
dlstractlon would necessarUrUad
to

^

dlcroLfd

iiiz:

Tz: z'-^'rTT''^
tolf^-->to

"

'r^^w'thln"",""'

hrs:ciir

.

urgi;:"r'

^^^^^

11.

An adequate test of this hypothesis
required that the decayed

initial opinion posttest and further,
that the delayed
.
Inlll
\ tbe divorced
posttest
from the earlier laboratory content
in which the
initial posttest had been conducted.
Because previous work on persistence
effects have typically employed
posttest delay intervals ranging f^om one
to two weeks (cf., Cook & Flay,
Note 3), it was decided to conduct the
delayed opinion posttest 10 days after
the initial posttest.
In actuality
subjects opinions were reassessed anywhere
between 8 and 15 days after
'"^^^ ^"'"'^^'^l averaging 10.30 days across
an subjects.
lllT.rlj'''T^"^\"^'^
all
An analysis of variance using number of days
between po3ttests as the dependent variable yielded no
effects, indic^iting tha- all
experimental groups had been subjected to approximately
the same posttest
delay interval. Regarding the second requirement,
unless playing the
role of cooperative subjects" to the hilt, the
low rate of suspicion or
innocent mention of their earlier laboratory
exi^erience expressed hy
suDjects during the "telephone opinion sur^/ey"
suggested that the experiment had been successful in divorcing the context of
the delayed pos^tesfrom the context of the initial opinion posttest.
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